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Introduction
The recent renaissance in scholarship about statutory interpreta-
tion, a long neglected subject,1 has left significant doubts about the
judiciary's use of legislative history. Some commentators have as-
sailed the courts' traditional reliance on committee reports, floor
statements, earlier versions of bills, and the like, as essentially mis-
guided and undemocratic. Apart from the text of a statute, legisla-
tures cannot express an intent, and individual legislators have no
power to speak for the body as a whole. Other commentators decry
such arid textualism, responding that legislative history can provide
some valuable assistance when one attempts to divine statutory
meaning or its animating purpose. This Article will inquire whether
the insights of this important debate might tell us anything about the
sources that courts should consult when they interpret agency regula-
tions, which often suffer from the same imprecision and ambiguity
found in statutes.
Legislators depend on the executive branch to play a significant
if not the predominant role in the specification of public law. By
delegating rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, legisla-
tures empower regulatory officials to make law on a par with any duly
enacted statute.2 Unlike legislatures, agencies maintain a direct and
continuous involvement in the texts of laws that they have authored.
Such regulations are often called "legislative" rules, both to empha-
size their authoritative status and to distinguish them from interpre-
tive rules and other non-binding administrative pronouncements.
3
1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 259-60 (1992); see also Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDuc. 469, 469 (1996) ("In the past
dozen years, an avalanche of scholarly and pedagogical materials on legislative processes
and their products has swamped legal education." (footnote omitted)).
2. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); see also Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162,2171 (1999) (explaining that the Department of Transporta-
tion's rules specifying visual acuity standards for truck drivers "have the force of law");
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Athchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (ex-
plaining that a rulemaking agency "speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has
the force of a statute"); National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("When Congress delegates rulemaking authority to an agency, and the agency
adopts legislative rules, the agency stands in the place of Congress and makes law."); Peter
L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 745,748 (1996) ("[R]ules may be subordinate legislation, but are
unmistakably legislative in their impact.").
3. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 196-97 (1993); Michael Asimow, Nonlegis-
lative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 383-88. Alternatively,
agencies may specify public law by proceeding in more of a judicial capacity. In exercising
their delegated authority to formulate policy, they generally enjoy unrestricted freedom to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
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Because legislative rules-like their statutory counterparts-inevita-
bly leave gaps and ambiguities,4 agencies must have an opportunity to
clarify their regulations through the issuance of interpretive rules and
other forms of guidance.5
Whether or not an agency provides such post-promulgation clari-
fication, do pre-promulgation materials provide a legitimate source of
guidance about the agency's original intent? As explained in one of
the leading treatises on statutory interpretation, "the courts have not
often considered problems having to do with the interpretation of
[administrative] regulations."' 6 In contrast to the recent outpouring of
267, 294 (1974) (holding that "the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles
in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication
lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion"); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194,203 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual,
ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency."). The question taken up here focuses in part on the extent to which agencies may
use adjudication to alter the meaning of regulations after they have decided initially to
proceed by rulemaking.
4. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 97-98 (1983); Strauss, supra note 2, at 748 ("Agency rules themselves require interpre-
tation and open a variety of issues."); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 955, 986-94 (1995). President Clinton's recent directive for agencies to use "plain
language" in rulemaking documents, see 63 Fed. Reg. 31,885 (1998), will in no way im-
prove this situation and, if not simply ignored, may instead compound the problem. See
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369,406 (1989).
5. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (noting that the
Medicare reimbursement "regulations are comprehensive and intricate in detail," but
adding that "[tihe APA does not require that all specific applications of a rule evolve by
further, more precise rules"); id. at 110 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("An agency certainly
cannot foresee every factual scenario with which it may be presented in administering its
programs; to fill in the gaps, it must rely on adjudication of particular cases and other
forms of agency action, such as the promulgation of interpretive rules and policy state-
ments .... "); Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996); Estate of Kurz v. Com-
missioner, 68 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "interpretation is a vital part
of the law-creation process"); see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to
Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1314, 1325 (1992) (conflating agency interpretations
of statutes and legislative rules).
6. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 31.06, at 544 (5th ed. 1992); see also id. ("In this new and largely unex-
plored field of interpretation, the courts have an opportunity to rethink fundamental
problems of communication, free from an established set of stereotyped rules." (footnote
omitted)). As another well-known authority in the field remarked in concluding an article
on the use of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation:
Ultimately, we must face up to the fact that all but a minute percentage of new
law is promulgated, not by legislatures or courts, but by administrative agencies
exercising rule-making power (which the British more aptly call "delegated leg-
islation"). If legislative history is part of external context and thus vital to under-
standing statutes, must not "regulatory history" be a vital part of understanding
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commentary on the utilization of legislative history, this subject has
received comparatively little attention.7 A few scholars have applied
insights gleaned from the intense debate over methods of statutory
interpretation to other texts having the same force and effect as leg-
islation enacted by Congress-namely, treaties negotiated by the
President and ratified by the Senate,8 as well as the federal rules of
procedure formulated by the Supreme Court.9 The same interpretive
issues involving legislative rules promulgated by administrative agen-
cies have gone largely unnoticed.
This relative lack of emphasis fails to take proper account of the
far greater prevalence of legislative rules issued by agencies than by
Congress, 10 even accepting the fact that such regulations typically ad-
the quasi-statutes that confront us as administrative regulations? Think about it.
Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 1125, 1162 (1983).
7. For the only comprehensive (and somewhat dated) effort to address this question,
see Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview,
53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 729 (1984) (summarizing some of the similarities and differences
between statutes and regulations as these may affect the manner in which courts go about
interpreting agency rules). See also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 689-90
(1996) (focusing on the appropriateness of deference to post-promulgation agency inter-
pretations of their rules, and noting with little elaboration that "important differences be-
tween the regulatory and legislative processes offer agencies the opportunity to produce
explanatory materials that courts may consult in ascertaining regulatory meaning"). Pro-
fessor Weaver's other related work, cited elsewhere herein, deals primarily with judicial
deference to post-promulgation agency interpretations of their regulations. See id. at 614
n.12. An entirely separate question concerns the extent to which agencies properly may
rely on legislative history to interpret the meaning of their enabling statutes. See Peter L.
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990).
8. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41
UCLA L. REV. 953, 1019-29 (1994); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpreta-
tion, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687,740-53 (1998); see also infra note 226 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993); see also infra notes 214-19
and accompanying text.
10. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("For some
time, the sheer amount of law-the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and
direct the operation of government-made by the agencies has far outnumbered the law-
making engaged in by Congress through the traditional process."); see also Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (noting that an agency had fully discharged
its statutory obligation to issue Medicare rules: "these regulations consumed some 640
pages of the Code of Federal Regulations"). In 1994, the latest official edition of the
United States Code ran 33,407 pages (in 26 volumes, excluding indices and the federal rules
of procedure appended to title 28). In 1998, the latest complete edition of the Code of
Federal Regulations occupied 130,665 pages (in 199 volumes, excluding title 3 and the in-
dex, though each C.ER. page contains less text than appears in U.S.C.). One can also
compare the annual output of the legislative and executive branches. In 1998, the Con-
gressional Record filled 28,639 pages. In that same year, the Federal Register filled 72,356
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dress more pedestrian matters," filling in the interstices of the legisla-
ture's grand reforms. Grant Gilmore's famous reference to this cen-
tury's "orgy of statute making"'12 seems quaint when compared to the
orgy of rulemaking that we have witnessed during the last half of the
century.13
This Article juxtaposes the contrasting judicial approaches to the
interpretation of statutes and regulations in order to suggest that the
courts have got it backwards when they largely ignore an agency's
original intent in promulgating a legislative rule. Part I discusses the
debate over how best to approach statutory interpretation, focusing in
particular on differing views about the legitimacy of consulting pre-
enactment materials in searching for the legislature's original intent.
After describing the increasing judicial use of legislative histories this
century, and the twin assaults on intentionalist theories launched by
proponents of the polar extremes of textualism and dynamic interpre-
tation, Part I sketches a hierarchy of pre-enactment legislative mate-
rials used by the courts, and lastly it explains why the resort to legisla-
tive histories occurs far less frequently when dealing with state
statutes.
Part II turns to the interpretation of legislative rules issued by
agencies, noting that courts have cared far less about original intent,
even though they could far more readily discern such intent from a
regulatory history. Instead, courts usually defer to an agency's post-
promulgation views about the meaning of ambiguous language in a
rule. Part II then explores some possible reasons for this paradoxical
treatment, and it suggests that courts should pay more attention to
original agency intent and consult pre-promulgation materials, which
are far superior to the pre-enactment materials that judges consult
pages. Although these numbers provide only a limited basis for comparison (and a tape
measure would have been faster), they reflect the approximate magnitude of the differ-
ence between the body producing legislation and the much more numerous entities re-
sponsible for issuing federal regulations. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 748 ("If that one
legislature can annually produce a book's worth of politically ratified work, all the jurisdic-
tion's rulemakers taken together are capable of generating several library shelves worth of
rules.").
11. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1477 (1992)
(explaining that "[interpretive] rules outnumber [legislative] rules, which in turn dwarf
statutes, which in turn dwarf constitutional provisions. As a general matter, we also see
more and more particular focus by the decisionmaker as we descended into the details").
12. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
13. As another prominent legal historian has observed, "by mid-twentieth century the
curve for administrative legislation topped that for statute law." JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1977) (adding that "by the
1950's lawyers with business clients and individuals with demands on the increasing service
functions of government had to turn more to administrative rule books than to statute
books to locate the legal frame of reference for their affairs").
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when interpreting statutes. Finally, Part II offers a hierarchy of ap-
propriate sources from which to construct such a regulatory history.
The Article concludes that courts should heed pre-promulgation ex-
pressions of agency intent more so than they do in divining legislative
intent.
I. The Modem Critique of Legislative History
Numerous courts and commentators have criticized the judicial
use of legislative history when interpreting statutes. This Part intro-
duces the competing approaches to statutory interpretation, empha-
sizing the extent to which this debate reflects a response to some of
the defects identified in the sorts of materials traditionally consulted
for evidence of legislative intent. The debate over statutory interpre-
tation turns, of course, even more fundamentally on competing con-
ceptions about the proper role of the courts and the indeterminacy of
language, 14 but this Article focuses on the aspects of these broader
disputes that concern the utilization of legislative histories, which
have provided a flashpoint for this debate, as a prelude for consider-
ing the appropriate uses of regulatory histories of agency rules. The
deeper jurisprudential disputes must remain in the background for
present purposes.
A. Historical Background
For just over a century, the federal courts have consulted pre-
enactment materials in the course of construing a statute. It was not
always so. During most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
resisted using legislative histories,15 though the relative scarcity of
federal legislation at the time offered few occasions for consulting
such materials for statutory interpretation even if otherwise available.
This approach comported with the longstanding English rule against
considering parliamentary materials.16 The Court first clearly en-
14. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Author-
ity, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993); Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial
Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch
Some Soupmeat," 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 2209 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gada-
merlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); Kent Greenawalt, The Nature
of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1449 (1997); Jeremy
Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV.
509 (1994).
15. See Alridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845); Hans W. Baade, "Original
Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1008-13,
1025-33, 1064-84 (1991) (describing the initial American reception of the English "no-
recourse" rule and its eventual decline in this country).
16. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B. 1769). English courts no longer
follow this rule. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 64-69 (H.L. 1992); Gordon Bale,
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dorsed a departure from this tradition in 1892,17 though it did not im-
mediately abandon the plain meaning rule for a broader inquiry into
legislative intent, deciding instead that judges could resort to extrinsic
materials only in cases of ambiguity.18
By mid-century, however, references to legislative histories had
become an increasingly common feature of judicial opinions, and
courts began to inquire about legislative intent in all cases. In 1940,
the United States Supreme Court explained: "When aid to construc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on superficial examination."'19 Legal process theo-
ries of the 1950s promoted this practice, though with the goal of iden-
tifying the legislature's general purposes (objective intent) rather than
its specific (subjective) intent,20 making this teleological approach a
distinct subset of intentionalism sometimes denominated as pur-
posivism.21 Although some notable jurists of the time expressed seri-
Parliamentary Debates and Statutory Interpretation: Switching on the Light or Rummaging
in the Ashcans of the Legislative Process, 74 CAN. BAR REv. 1, 13 (1995); Michael P.
Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United States: An
Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT'LL. 231,253 (1999).
17. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-65 (1892); see
also Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1904); United States v. National Marine
Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 391 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (describing Holy
Trinity as a watershed); Baade, supra note 15, at 1084 ("The English no-recourse rule had
ceased to prevail in the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.").
18. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917); Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899).
19. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S.
423, 432 (1943) (holding the same for treaties); Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule
and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2 (1939) (en-
couraging the use of legislative history materials); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV. 886, 893 (1930) (same); Frederick J. de Sloov re, Ex-
trinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 552-55 (1940) (same).
20. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1379 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) ("Evidence of specific intention with respect to particular ap-
plications is competent only to the extent that the particular applications illuminate the
general purpose and are consistent with other evidence of it."); id. at 1378 (assuming "that
the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasona-
bly"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Pro-
cess, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2047-49 (1994) (discussing the substantial initial influence
of this perspective).
21. More recently, Judge Posner has advocated using an "imaginative reconstruction"
approach, which has clear antecedents in the legal process emphasis on the legislature's
general purposes. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817-22 (1983); cf. Richard A. Posner, Legisla-
tion and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431,445 (1989) (conceding the limi-
tations of this approach).
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ous concern about the growing reliance on pre-enactment materials,
22
this practice became quite widespread. In an unanimous 1976 deci-
sion, the Supreme Court reversed a lower federal court for interpret-
ing a statute without having considered its legislative history33
By the early 1980s, surveys confirmed extensive judicial refer-
ences to legislative histories,24 but the chorus of criticism began in
earnest at around this time. Of course, strands of these various objec-
tions and alternative approaches to statutory interpretation have long
existed, at least since the Realist critique of classical legal ortho-
doxy,25 but the terms of this debate have resurfaced in a focused way
during the last two decades. Notwithstanding sometimes withering
attacks from commentators, inspired in no small part by Justice
Scalia's repeated admonitions about the hazards of this practice,2 6 the
22. See United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-20 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (objecting to the "weird endeavor" of attempting a "psychoanalysis of Con-
gress" and that the use of legislative history "pulls federal law ... into a fog in which little
can be seen if found"); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing similar concerns); Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority's reli-
ance on materials provided by witnesses at hearings would tempt outsiders to plant their
preferred glosses on the bill in the legislative history); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 540-44 (1947); Robert H. Jackson,
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 124-25 (1948); see also Arthur W. Mur-
phy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
"Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1304-11 (1975) (describing some early
resistance among the lower courts to the use of extrinsic materials for construing statutes).
23. See Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976).
24. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRIcS J. 294, 302-03 (1982) (docu-
menting the dramatic increase in references to pre-enactment materials since 1938);
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 203-06, 216 (1983) (noting significant though inconsis-
tent citations to various types of legislative history materials, but concluding that these
rarely determined the outcome of a case).
25. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399-401
(1950) (identifying contradictory canons of construction); Max Radin, Statutory Interpre-
tation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 872 (1930) (dismissing legislative intent as "undiscoverable
in fact, [and] irrelevant if it were discovered"). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nut-
shell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1731 (1993).
26. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-06, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Bradley C. Kark-
kainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 414-32 (1994); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textu-
alism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991); Arthur Stock,
Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 161-71.
January 2000] DIVINING REGULATORY INTENT
judicial urge to consult legislative materials to divine congressional
intent remains fairly strong,27 even if now tempered by a greater ap-
preciation of the limitations and pitfalls of this practice.28
B. Terms of the Contemporary Debate
At the risk of seriously oversimplifying a rich and complex de-
bate, one may group theories of statutory interpretation into three
broad categories: textualism, intentionalism, and dynamism.29 Textu-
alism and intentionalism both strive to reconstruct the original intent
of the enacting legislature but differ over where to look for this intent;
textualists care only about the language of the statute, while inten-
tionalists also look to legislative history.30 Proponents of dynamic in-
27. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 612 n.4 (claiming that "the Court's prac-
tice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past," and predicting "that the prac-
tice will likewise reach well into the future"); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common
Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the
Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) ("[W]hen measured
against other empirical analyses, the 1996 Term reflects some resurgence in the use of leg-
islative history and an apparent decline in another benchmark of the new textualism--cita-
tions to the dictionary."); id. at 37 ("If the data from the 1996 Term are predictive of fu-
ture Terms, and the trend toward textualism is reversing, it may be that the critique of
legislative history is losing steam." (footnote omitted)); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1088
(1992) ("If originalism retains no defenders in the academy, it seems only fair to ask how it
could have remained a viable approach for the judiciary.").
28. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
277, 281-300 (1990) (describing the recent though still unsuccessful "assault" on the con-
ventional approach, but again finding that legislative histories generally had only a mar-
ginal impact on the Court's decisions); see also id. at 309-10 ("One can detect a certain
tone of caution in the Court's use of legislative history in almost all cases [from the 1988-
89 Term]. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to assume that caution represents an
awareness of and a reaction to the persistent attacks of the textualists."); Gregory E.
Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in
the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (noting a similar type of effect); Law-
rence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 235, 283 (applauding the Supreme Court's failure to embrace textualism
even while it has been influenced by the critique); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357 (1994) ("[T]here can be no
doubt that textualism is in ascendancy and the use of legislative history to discover con-
gressional intent is very much on the decline.").
29. For introductions to this subject, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1995); KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
TWENTY QUESTIONS (1999); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCrION TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997); WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1997).
30. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
terpretation start with the static text but strive to effectuate the pur-
pose of the legislation and adapt it as necessary to deal with changed
circumstances. Naturally, each of these categories contains important
gradations. For instance, one may subdivide textualists into literalists
and contextualists; intentionalists may vary in their willingness to ac-
cept different sources of legislative history; and dynamic interpreta-
tion broadly includes a range of approaches that look beyond text and
history to a greater or lesser extent. More importantly, even these
broad categories overlap, and in practice most courts and commenta-
tors, including the staunchest of advocates for one particular theory,
adopt some mix of approaches.31
For our purposes, the competing views about legislative history
represent the most salient feature of this debate. Again, at the risk of
mischaracterizing a quite complicated intellectual history, textualism
resurfaced with a vengeance in the 1980s, though in a more sophisti-
cated garb than old-style literalism; intentionalists rebutted these ob-
jections while also conceding problems with some of the excesses of
the past in consulting legislative history; and, finally, dynamic statu-
tory interpretation coalesced as an alternative response to the short-
comings with both intentionalism and textualism, though it had clear
antecedents in the common law tradition.
REV. 919,929 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRCKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988)) ("Statutory interpretation doctrine continues
to reflect a basic dichotomy between textualist and intentionalist interpretive ap-
proaches."). For a more recent and detailed overview of the competing positions, see
Carlos E. Gonzdlez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 586, 595-633
(1996).
31. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 400 (1995) (advocating a prag-
matic approach); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345-62 (1990) (suggesting a model for prag-
matic interpretation); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes,
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 558-59 (1992); Robert J. Mar-
tineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of
Statutory Construction, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40 (1993) (criticizing the disjunction
between theory and practice in statutory interpretation); Schacter, supra note 27, at 18-20,
36, 55 (calling the Court's eclectic or "blended approach" to statutory interpretation
"common law originalism" that cuts across the dichotomies drawn by most scholars); id. at
19 ("While statutory language is the consistent point of departure, and there is, thus,
plainly an originalist component to the Court's approach, it is only a distinctly diluted
form of originalism that the Court seems to be practicing.... [T]he Justices regularly in-
voke a wide-ranging set of judicially-created devices to develop and give meaning to the
contested statutory language."); Zeppos, supra note 27, at 1120 ("[Njeither originalism nor
textualism adequately describes the Court's existing practice. Rather, the Court's ap-
proach is eclectic, relying not only on text and originalist sources, but on practical consid-
erations and other dynamic sources as well."); id. at 1125 (finding a "remarkable con-
stancy" in the types of sources cited over a hundred-year period).
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(1) The Textualist Critique
The textualists reacted in part to a growing appreciation of the
flimsiness of commonly cited pre-enactment materials. For instance,
some of the "colloquies" published in the Congressional Record never
took place as floor debates; instead, they represented written submis-
sions offered by individual members anxious to insert some commen-
tary that may prove helpful to constituents in the course of future liti-
gation over the meaning of the statute.32 Similarly, because staffers
shoulder primary responsibility for drafting bills and committee re-
ports, lobbyists may more readily succeed in influencing their con-
tent.33 At the very end of the Reagan administration, the Department
of Justice even issued a report cataloging some of the misuses of leg-
islative history materials by the courts? 4
More seriously, some critics complained that judges focused on
the legislative history to such an extent that they forgot about the text
itself.35 Borrowing from the insights of public choice theory, textual-
ists argued that the enacted language of a statute provided the only
legitimate evidence of a legislature's intent.36 In rejecting the ten-
32. See Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress's Intent, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at Al; see also Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 540-42, 545-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (describing the Congressional Record in the course of dismissing complaints al-
leging that it fails to reflect accurately what transpires on the floor).
33. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Na-
tional Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819,828 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43,44-45 (1988).
34. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989). Congress also held hearings on the subject at
around the same time. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. (1990).
35. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
164 (1975) (recounting a "Canadian gibe that in the United States whenever the legislative
history is ambiguous it is permissible to refer to the statute"); William T. Mayton, Law
Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J. 113, 114 (1992). An unusually candid example of this
tendency appears in an administrative law classic. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971) ("The legislative history... is ambiguous....
Because of this ambiguity it is clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves
to find the legislative intent."); see also Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440,452-67 (1989)
(trumping statutory text with some contrary legislative intent); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984) (referring repeatedly to the clarity of congres-
sional "intent" rather than the terms of the enabling statute).
36. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (Scalia, J.)
("The best evidence of [congressional] purpose is the statutory text.... ."); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340,
1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Statutes are law, not evidence of law."); see also
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dency to personify Congress, they emphasized that collective bodies
comprised of hundreds of members cannot form an intent apart from
the text of legislation.37
Accordingly, the judiciary's preoccupation with finding this elu-
sive intent in the various materials that make up a legislative history
posed constitutional problems. Critics argued that the intentionalist
approach circumvented the requirements for the passage of federal
legislation-namely, bicameralism and presentment.38  By treating
language in committee reports and floor statements as authoritative,
courts distorted the lawmaking dynamic, inviting members of Con-
gress to take short-cuts. Legislators found it easier to manufacture
legislative history than attempt to amend a bill, 39 and those members
Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998) ("To give substantive effect to this flotsam and jet-
sam of the legislative process is to short-circuit the constitutional scheme for making
law."); Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation
of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 643-44 (1994) (contrasting this view with the notion that
statutory text is merely some evidence of the law).
37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,'
hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a
whole, however, has only outcomes."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure
in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994) ("Intent is elusive
for a natural person, fictive for a collective body."); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a
"They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 249
(1992); Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633,645-48 (1995).
38. See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a
small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an intent of the Con-
gress."); see also RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 21-24, 56-85 (1996)
(explaining that even the work of committees normally reflects the input of only a few of
the members or their staff).
39. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting one legislator's re-
markably candid floor statement as follows: "I have an amendment here in my hand which
could be offered, but if we can make up some legislative history which would do the same
thing, I am willing to do it."); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,237 (1984) (fearing that judicial
reliance on colloquies "would open the door to the inadvertent, or perhaps even planned,
undermining of the language actually voted on"); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("[T]his court sitting en banc has condemned the well-recognized phenomenon
of deliberate manipulation of legislative history at the committee level to achieve what
likely cannot be won before Congress as a whole."); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Self-Limitation
of Legislative History: An Intrainstitutional Perspective, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 232,
233 (1992) ("[lIt costs less to create legislative history than it does to change the words of
the text .... A single legislator, for example, cannot change the words of a bill herself, but
she can, by herself, add to the legislative history."); W. David Slawson, Legislative History
and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV.
383, 397 (1992) ("Manufacturing legislative history offers two advantages over amending.
First, it is quicker and easier than drafting, debating, and voting on an amendment. Sec-
ond, manufacturing increases the chances that the member's intentions will become law if
they are controversial."); see also id. at 403-10 (objecting to the judiciary's reliance on such
DIVINING REGULATORY IN4TNTJanuary 2000]
who may have disagreed with such explanations got no opportunity to
alter the legislative history except by noting their own objections on
the floor and hoping that courts will notice these.40
Finally, textualists have objected to the use of legislative history
because it offers judges too ready a mechanism for inappropriately
reaching a preferred outcome even in the face of contrary statutory
text.41 In addition to selectively empowering individual members of
Congress or their staff, the search for a legislative intent disguises un-
constitutional lawmaking by members of the judiciary. Thus, textual-
ist critics contend that intentionalism short-circuits the legislative pro-
cess and invites usurpation of the legislative power by the judicial
branch.
When statutory language contains ambiguities, textualists might
employ various canons of construction, on the theory that Congress
legislates against the background of this judge-made law.42 Textual-
ists also take statutory structure and context into account,43 including
materials).
40. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 16,918 (1982) (statement of Sen. Armstrong) ("If there
were matter within this report which was disagreed to... even by a majority of all Sena-
tors, there would be no way for us to change the report. I could not offer an amendment
tonight to amend the committee report.").
41. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 100-01 (calling a purposive approach judicial "usurpa-
tion"); Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t
does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative
materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative interpre-
tation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable."); Sinclair, 870 F.2d at
1343 ("Often there is so much legislative history that a court can manipulate the meaning
of a law by choosing which snippets to emphasize ... ."); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d
1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("[L]egislative history can
be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is."); ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17-18, 35 (1997) (claiming that the use of legislative history
"has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the courts' policy pref-
erences, rather than neutral principles of law").
42. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("What is of para-
mount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear in-
terpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."); see also Geof-
frey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179, 1224-
25; Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 231, 250-56 (offering a pragmatic justification for empha-
sizing text); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 941-60 (1992) (defending the use of canons); David A. Strauss, Why
Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1565, 1579-82 (1997) (same).
43. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
696-708 (1995) (considering the text, structure, and history of the Endangered Species
Act); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (Scalia, J.) (calling statutory construction "a holistic endeavor"); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 319 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56
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any relevant language in other sections or even unrelated statutes as
well as linguistic conventions of the time-primarily, dictionaries then
in use.44 Armed with these various tools, a textualist can confidently
cut through almost any seeming ambiguity in a statutory text. Except
in rare cases to confirm that an apparently absurd result was not in
fact what the legislature had intended,45 the adherents of this ap-
proach, most notably Justice Scalia, adamantly refuse to consider a
statute's legislative history.
46
(2) The Intentionalist Response
Intentionalists and others responded to these textualist critiques
in a variety of ways. Among other things, they emphasized that no-
body views legislative history as authoritative, but as only one source
of perhaps weak information about the meaning of an authoritative,
though ambiguous, statutory text.47 Some commentators have sug-
gested that this more enlightened approach actually represents a new
form of originalism, distinct from the older forms of intentionalism or
purposivism that, at least in practice, allowed legislative intent to
trump plain text.48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703,706-10 (1988); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 321, 341-62 (1995); cf. Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Ad-
ministrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,1041-44, 1049 (1998) (distinguishing contextualism
from textualism's use of context to illuminate the meaning of particular words in a stat-
ute); id. at 1031, 1112 (arguing that greater attention should be paid to background princi-
ples of law when interpreting statutes).
44. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,225-34 (1994) (Scalia, J.);
sef also Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-76 (1994) (looking at
the definition of "burden of proof' used by courts at the time of the statute's passage);
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-66 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (finding the established
meaning of a statutory phrase in decisional law where dictionaries provided inconsistent
connotations); infra note 55 and accompanying text (assailing "dictionary shopping" by
textualists).
45. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Inc., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
46. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927,
930 n.* (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joined the entire opinion except for one footnote
that considered some legislative history); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S.
953, 955 n.t (1997) (same); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (lambasting the majority for referring to some legislative history).
47. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 54-55 ("Although a claim that legislative history
conclusively establishes a specific intent on a question not resolved in the statutory text
will usually be vulnerable to debate and critique, the more general use of committee re-
ports and other background materials to illuminate the policy concerns that generated the
law can fruitfully advance the interpretive enterprise even without identifying a control-
ling intent.").
48. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case
for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1988); Martin H. Redish
& Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the
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In any event, giving priority to the text and viewing legislative
history as only some evidence of intent would answer the constitu-
tional concern because bicameralism and presentment only apply to
congressional texts that have binding effect.49 After all, the Constitu-
tion separately requires that Congress maintain and publish a record
of its proceedings.50 The constitutional objection would have more
force if Congress ever enacted a law that directed judges to adhere,
for instance, to the views expressed in committee reports when inter-
preting a statute.51 Instead, where courts do so under no legislative
compulsion and merely as some aid to interpretation, they act consis-
tently with the "judicial power" vested by Article III, especially if one
considers the essentially common law approaches to statutory inter-
pretation that prevailed at the time of the founding.52
Intentionalists seriously doubt that textualism will reduce judicial
activism.53 Judges fixated on a particular reading of a statute can de-
fend it just as easily by selecting and revising canons of construction 5 4
or shopping for a suitable dictionary definition,55 as by dredging a
Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REV. 803, 830, 858-79 (1994);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295,1336-73 (1990).
49. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 845,863 (1992).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceed-
ings, and from time to time publish the same ... ."). This clause does not, however, spec-
ify the content of such reports, see Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that "these official journals are abbreviated versions of congressional pro-
ceedings" and are "distinct from the Congressional Record"), and the Constitution vests
in Congress the power to "determine the rules of its proceedings," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 2; see also United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D,C. Cir. 1995) (noting
that courts will not review compliance by Congress with its self-imposed rules of proce-
dure).
51. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 242, 249-50 (1998). Omnibus appropriations measures
sometimes incorporate committee reports by reference. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-202, §
107, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-434 (1987); see also Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Direc-
tions in Statutes, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 219-20 (1994) (cataloging possible types of
interpretive directions related to the use of legislative history). Some state legislatures
have explicitly authorized, though did not require, courts to consider extrinsic aids in
statutory construction. See, e.g., 1 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(7) (1995).
52. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1522-28 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
(1997)).
53. See Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93,
110, 124-25 (1995); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1164-87 (1992).
54. See Eskridge, supra note 52, at 1542-47 (describing this as the problem of "loose
canons").
55. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 334 (1998); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory
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legislative history. Thus, textualism does not circumscribe judicial
discretion but may even increase it by interpreting ambiguous texts
according to any one of a number of judge-made canons of construc-
tion. Intentionalists also explain that members of Congress manufac-
ture legislative history for purposes other than hoodwinking judges-
namely, influencing the votes of their colleagues, communicating
views to their constituents, and hoping to guide agency officials en-
trusted with administering the statute 56 -in which case judicial ab-
stention will not necessarily alter the legislative process by redirecting
energy into clearer specification of law in statutory text. Finally, they
note that the textualists' absurd result exception belies the theoretical
attack against the possibility of finding an extra-statutory intent.57
The fact that most legislators do not read the pre-enactment ex-
planatory materials hardly undermines its value as some evidence of
intent. Legislators do not always read the bills for which they vote,
58
yet textualists pore over that text with excessive confidence that min-
ute drafting choices will reflect important distinctions in meaning.
Even those legislators who conscientiously read the text of bills be-
Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1447-48 (1994); see also Samuel A. Thumma &
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The Supreme Court's Use of
Dictionaries, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 227 (1999) (exhaustively surveying and criticizing the
Court's increasing reliance on dictionaries in statutory interpretation and other contexts).
56. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 686 n.2 (1991); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697,716 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J.,
concurring); Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and
History, 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 209,210-12 (1958); see also McNollgast, Legislative Intent.
The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1994, at 3,25-29 (explaining why not all legislative talk is "cheap"); Edward L. Ru-
bin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Stat-
utes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 45-64 (1991) (arguing that theories of statutory interpretation
should not assume that legislators care only about maximizing their re-election chances);
Strauss, supra note 7, at 329-31 (explaining that agencies carefully consult the legislative
history of their enabling statute).
57. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 13, 28-29
(1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 365,
378-79 (1990); Wald, supra note 28, at 296-97; see also Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity
and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 158-62 (1994) (elaborating on this inconsistency).
58. See Zeppos, supra note 48, at 1311-12; Christopher Cox, Editorial, The Con Game
We Call Congress: In the Still of the Night, Members Raised Pay, Raided Treasury,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 26, 1989, at G3 (providing one member's account of the
process of enacting the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989: "So voluminous was this mon-
ster bill that it was hauled into the chamber in an oversized corrugated box.... While
reading it was obviously out of the question, it's true that I was permitted to walk around
the box and gaze upon it from several angles, and even to touch it."). Indeed, even when
given a copy of a bill, it appears that legislators rely more frequently on summaries ap-
pearing in committee reports or other materials. See Larry Evans et al., Congressional
Procedure and Statutory Interpretation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 239,245 (1993).
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fore a vote probably do not consult lay dictionaries for clarification of
unclear terms,59 and they rarely know of the Supreme Court's favored
canons of construction, yet textualists put great stock in such aids to
meaning. Indeed, for courts to quibble with the subdelegation of leg-
islative work shows a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment,60 and it also smacks a bit of hypocrisy insofar as some fed-
eral judges give their law clerks tremendous responsibility in drafting
opinions.61 Naive textualism may demand the impossible of Congress
and, thereby, actually work to undermine the legislative power rela-
tive to the other branches of government. 62
Even so, some intentionalists have come to regard legislative his-
tory materials as sufficiently untrustworthy that they would confine
any search for legislative intent to other sources. In particular, these
commentators concede that the judicial use of legislative history sig-
nals to the participants in the legislative process that, by shaping the
historical materials, they easily can influence how courts later will in-
59. See Zeppos, supra note 48, at 1320-21. Textualists respond that the authoritative
use of legislative history amounts to an unconstitutional legislative "self-delegation" that
differs from judicial references to sources external to the legislative process. See John F.
Manning, Textualism as Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,739 (1997).
60. See Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 597-615 (1994); id. at 588 ("To denigrate legislative history is to deni-
grate Congress as an institution."); see also James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary
on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1, 104-05 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 77 (1994) ("Insisting that
statutory interpretation ignore legislative history and adhering to dictionaries at the ex-
pense of common sense, the new textualism is insensitive to the expectations of elected
representatives."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 752 (1995) (criticizing the recent emergence of "hypertextualism," which he charac-
terized as "finding linguistic precision where it does not exist, and relying exclusively on
the abstract meaning of a particular word or phrase even when other evidence suggests
strongly that Congress intended a result inconsistent with that usage").
61. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 50; Zeppos, supra note 48, at 1313 & n.68. Does a
classic Supreme Court opinion lose precedential force if later historical research uncovers
that the nominal author had never written or reviewed the opinion? On the recent con-
troversy over allegations concerning the drafting of Supreme Court opinions in particular,
see David J. Garrow, "The Lowest Form of Animal Life"?: Supreme Court Clerks and Su-
preme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 855, 860, 863-65, 869, 872, 874-76 (1999) (re-
viewing EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998)).
62. See Breyer, supra note 49, at 873 ("[I]nsofar as courts discourage Congress from
using the regular committee, floor debate, and conference process, the technical quality of
statutory law is likely to deteriorate significantly. The statutory language inserted by
amendment on the floor of Congress produces absurd, anomalous, or unfair results.");
John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. LJ. 565, 572 (1992); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statu-
tory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 905-07 (1982) (criticizing
judicial "remands" of legislation as unrealistic).
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terpret a statute, thereby inevitably distorting the historical record.63
Thus, even under intentionalist premises, one might do better not to
look for genuine signs of intent in the legislative history-and focus
instead on the statute's text and context, judicial precedent, and the
canons of construction-because of the high likelihood that judges
will make mistakes if tempted to consult any pre-enactment materi-
als.64
(3) Dynamic Interpretation
The dynamic theories of statutory interpretation do not share
textualism's revulsion toward legislative history, but they also do not
share intentionalism's evident preoccupation with such pre-enactment
materials. Instead, legislative text and history provide starting points
for judges when struggling to make sense of a statute in new and per-
haps unforeseen circumstances. 65 Proponents of this essentially fluid
approach worry much more about identifying the broader purposes
rather than any particular intent of the legislature in order to guide
courts in the process of figuratively updating or revising the text
where necessary. Whereas both intentionalists and textualists care
63. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1012 (1992) ("[T]he widespread expectation that judges will consult
legislative histories leads to distortion of the histories and makes them unreliable indica-
tors of congressional intent."); id. at 1017 ("Once they know that judges will refer to leg-
islative history when interpreting statutes, legislators, staffers, and lobbyists have great
incentives to introduce comments in the record solely to influence future interpretations-
and especially to insert statements that could not win majority support in Congress.").
64. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1874 (1998)
("[D]istinctive features of legislative history, particularly its volume and heterogeneity,
may increase the risk of erroneous judicial interpretation even if an unbiased interpreter,
acting under no constraints of time, information, or expertise, would find that the legisla-
tive history reliably reflects a collective intention concerning the relevant interpretive
question."); id. at 1896 ("Even assuming that legislative intent is a coherent concept, that
legislative history reliably reflects legislative intent in a broad range of cases, and that con-
stitutional norms permit courts to consult legislative history, there are reasons to doubt
judicial competence to discern legislative intent from legislative history.").
65. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 20, 21-22, 56-61 (1988) (favoring a "nautical" rather than an "archaeological" meta-
phor to describe the interpretive process); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1482-84, 1496-97, 1554 (1987); see also GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that courts
should exercise an updating function when interpreting obsolete statutes). For illustrative
criticisms of these approaches, see Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911, 930-35 (1996); Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullifi-
cation: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1126, 1146-72 (1982) (book review); Redish & Chung, supra note 48, at 831-58; Rob-
ert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
STAN. L. REV. 213,249-57 (1983) (book review).
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about original meaning, notwithstanding sharp differences over how
to identify it, proponents of dynamic approaches are not terribly con-
cerned about what the legislature may have intended on the date of
statutory enactment. Instead, among other techniques, they advocate
the use of value-laden canons of construction to assist judges with the
interpretive process.66
C. Crafting a Legislative History Hierarchy
Whatever one thinks of this debate, courts, lawyers, and com-
mentators seemingly cannot resist the use of legislative history, but
they have become more aware of its limitations.67 Thus, intentional-
ists concede that not all sources for divining legislative intent deserve
equal consideration, and they have identified the relative strength of
different pre-enactment materials, consistent with a rough hierarchy
that has emerged from the Supreme Court's decisions over the
years. 68 For the most part, committee reports accompanying a bill
and statements made by its sponsors during floor debates receive the
highest marks, while post-enactment commentary merits scant atten-
tion. Even these guideposts have exceptions, of course, and between
them one finds a wide range of pre-enactment materials that courts
sometimes consult.
Committee reports deserve more weight than floor statements,69
though not everyone agrees with this particular rank-ordering,70 espe-
66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1017-20 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 412, 451-56 (1989). For a criticism of this particular aspect
of dynamic interpretation, see Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Can-
ons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (1990).
67. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
68. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions":
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legis-
lative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39,41-60; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 636-40, 689-90 (1990); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING
WITH STATUTES 42-44 (1982) (elaborating on this hierarchy); William D. Popkin, Fore-
word.- Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 307-19 (1990)
(same).
69. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) ("We have repeatedly
recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Re-
ports on the bill."); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n.15 (1982) ("The contemporane-
ous remarks of a sponsor of legislation are certainly not controlling in analyzing legislative
history."); see also SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand,
J.) ("[W]hile members deliberately express their personal position upon the general pur-
poses of the legislation, as to the details of its articulation they accept the work of the
committees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go on in any other
way.").
70. Compare Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375 ("Even in the setting of the congressional committee, in many
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cially where the weaker source speaks more directly to the specific
question, as may happen when an amendment emerges during floor
consideration of a bill.71 Among floor debates, the statements made
by a bill's sponsors or managers generally trump those of other mem-
bers of the legislature,72 and, among the latter group, comments by
supporters should prevail over the remarks made by opponents of a
bill. 73
Courts sometimes look further back into the legislative process
for clues about intended statutory meaning. Differences in the lan-
guage of earlier versions of the bill may provide limited insights about
legislative intent. 74 Courts might find the transcripts of committee
mark-up sessions more meaningful though rarely available,75 but the
cases the report adopted will likely not even have been reviewed, much less written or
studied, by all members. Given these practical realities, only the record of speeches on the
floor of either chamber should be considered even minimally probative of Congress's in-
tent."), with Costello, supra note 68, at 66-73 (defending the traditional preference for
committee reports over floor statements); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Ob-
servations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385 ("I always find that the committee report is the most
useful device .... [It usually] represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and
debate on the issue."); Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be
Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.i. 979, 980-82 (1990) (identifying some of the flaws with the
use of recorded floor debates); Schacter, supra note 27, at 43 ("Compared to so much else
in the legislative process, committee reports are public, deliberative, reasoned documents
that create a policymaking record.").
71. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987); Brock v. Pierce
County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); see also Chicago, Milwauke, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. v.
Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465,473-76 (1949) (crediting a floor manager's renuncia-
tion of the completeness of language in a committee report); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081,
1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
72. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,524-27 (1982) (relying heavily
on comments made by a sponsor); Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956) (same).
One commentator recently has argued that, because legislative history should not be con-
sulted for evidence of a collective subjective intent but instead as an institutional expres-
sion emerging from an obligation to explain and justify legislation to the public, only
committee reports and the floor statements by managers or sponsors deserve considera-
tion as the official explanatory materials. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without
Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 84-88, 97 (1999) (allowing, however, for reference to other pre-enactment mate-
rials if both the text and these official explanations leave unresolved ambiguities).
73. See NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) ("In their zeal to defeat a bill,
[opponents] understandably tend to overstate its reach."); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956) ("An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of
the majority and thus, indirectly, amend a bill."); see also Costello, supra note 68, at 71-72
(defending these traditional distinctions when referring to floor statements).
74. Cf. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714,723 (1989) (refusing to "attach decisive sig-
nificance to the unexplained disappearance of one word from an unenacted bill").
75. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 236-38 (1984) (considering remarks evidently
made during a mark-up session); Borrell v. United States Int'l Communication Agency,
682 F.2d 981, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); see also Costello, supra note 68, at 46-50 (dis-
cussing the possible use of transcripts from mark-up sessions as well as conference com-
January 2000]
transcripts of committee hearings, which include testimony presented
by officials from the executive branch as well as private parties, offer
even less useful guidance if one wants to identify likely legislative in-
tent.76
Courts generally and properly treat post-enactment explanatory
materials with suspicion. Presidential signing statements may merit
some limited attention,77 but congressional explanations of legislative
intent in the wake of passage deserve little notice. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned, "the views of a subsequent Congress
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. 78
This is particularly true of post hoc explanations offered by individual
legislators about what their colleagues sought to accomplish when en-
acting a particular law.79
mittee actions); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Con-
gress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561,575 (1992) (urging the publica-
tion of transcripts of mark-up sessions for this reason).
76. See, e.g., S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972) (noting
that "we have been extremely wary of testimony before committee hearings"). But cf.
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 31-32 (1982) (crediting the congres-
sional testimony of Treasury Department officials who helped draft language adopted by
the committee); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (con-
sidering records of hearings that took place during the four years prior to passage); TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 n.23 (1978) (considering the testimony of witnesses at a commit-
tee hearing). See generally Allison C. Giles, Note, The Value of Nonlegislators' Contribu-
tions to Legislative History, 79 GEO. LJ. 359 (1990).
77. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presi-
dential "Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 234-38 (1988); Mark R. Killenbeck,
A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative His-
tory, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239, 309-10 (1995); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential
Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. LJ. 699, 717 (1991); see also Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 424 (1996) (citing a governor's signing statement); cf.
Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What's the Dif-
ference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 235, 244 (1999) (discussing presidential signing state-
ments that express constitutional doubts).
78. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 n.4 (1993);
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 295 n.9 (1992); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67
(1988); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 823-24 & n.42 (1980); Michael Livingston,
What's Blue and White and Not Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General Explana-
tions and the Role of "Subsequent" Tax Legislative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 91, 122-
24 (1994). But cf. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 36 n.12
(1981) (considering legislators' explanations for not subsequently amending the statute);
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572,596 (1980) (suggesting that "the
views of subsequent Congresses... are entitled to significant weight").
79. See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982) (re-
jecting affidavit from a legislator who had sponsored amendment years earlier); Quern v.
Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1978) (noting that "post hoc observations by a single
member of Congress carry little if any weight"); see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board
of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 131 na.* (1987) (noting that "the creation of legislative his-
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A different response to growing concerns about the use of legis-
lative history materials would focus less on the stage during which
those materials emerged and more on their character. Thus, courts
should consider legislative materials that help explain the text but not
those that embellish it.80 Although judges surely find it easier to dif-
ferentiate among a hierarchy of sources based on their genesis rather
than their character, the proposed distinction would respond more di-
rectly to many of textualism's critiques without entirely sacrificing the
context offered by these extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation.
D. State Legislative Histories
Although normally addressed in the context of federal statutes,
courts may attempt to use legislative histories to illuminate the
meaning of state enactments as well.81 Do the critiques leveled
against the reliance on pre-enactment congressional materials have
the same force when dealing with a state legislature? Because the
documentation of state legislative activity remains less thorough than
at the federal level,82 practical constraints affect this debate as much
tory through the post hoc statements of interested onlookers is entitled to no weight").
80. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REv. 819, 875-83 (1991) (calling such
embellishments of the text "pseudo-regulations" to which the courts should pay only lim-
ited attention); id. at 876 ("By drafting the equivalent of regulations in the legislative his-
tory, Congress, Treasury staff, and well-connected lobbyists effectively exclude the public
from a portion of the regulatory process."); see also Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 70 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (objecting to such embellishments, which he char-
acterized as "a kind of legislative-history 'rider'). The same thing happens when agencies
try to circumvent rulemaking procedures by reinterpreting their regulations instead of
amending them. See infra Part II.C.2.
81. See GWENDOLYN B. FOLSOM, LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 5 (1972) ("Use of legislative history by the state courts has
come more slowly and is still much less extensive than in the federal courts."); Kenneth R.
Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use
of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARO. L. REV. 161, 201 (1996)
("[V]ery little attention has been paid to the use of legislative history at the state court
level. This may be partly because state legislatures typically generate legislative history
which is smaller in volume and less complicated to review than their federal counter-
part."). In the last few decades, the availability and use of legislative history materials in
statutory interpretation at the state level has increased. For discussions focusing on some
individual states, see Malinda Allison & James Hambleton, Research in Texas Legislative
History, 47 TEX. B.J. 314 (1984); David E. O'Connor, The Use of Connecticut Legislative
History in Statutory Construction, 58 CONN. B.J. 422 (1984); Robert M. Rhodes & Susan
Seereiter, The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida-An Update, 13
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1985); Arthur C. Wang, Comment, Legislative History in Wash-
ington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 (1984).
82- See Baade, supra note 15, at 1085 ("Indifference to the documentation of legisla-
tive history at the state level has been, and continues to be to this day, a basic feature of
the American legal culture."); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
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as theoretical ones do. If state courts have had few or no pre-
enactment materials at their disposal in the past, do they tend toward
textualism, purposivism, or dynamism in statutory interpretation out
of simple necessity?
Among state court judges, Roger Traynor, formerly Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court, has offered some valuable guidance
on these questions. Deservedly credited for his contributions to a di-
verse range of subjects such as torts and conflicts,83 Justice Traynor's
views on matters of statutory interpretation have received only sparse
notice,84 even though he spent the first decade of his legal career spe-
cializing in tax law,85 a discipline far removed from the common law
style that became his primary legacy. The failure to consider his less
distinctive forays, first as a scholar and then also as a jurist, into ques-
tions of statutory interpretation misses a potentially important contri-
bution.
Although Traynor hinted at a seemingly dynamic approach to
statutory interpretation,86 perhaps a natural outgrowth of his creative
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30
(1995); Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48
U. PrIT. L. REv. 639, 651 (1987) ("[A]s a general rule, in New York and probably most
state legislatures, legislative intent is evidenced only in the language of a statute. Very
rarely will a bill memo, committee report, or floor speech offer reliable insight into legisla-
tive intent."). This situation becomes more complicated as the initiative process substi-
tutes for legislation. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent" Interpretive
Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 119-20 (1995).
83. See Donald P. Barrett, Master of Judicial Wisdom, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1060, 1061-62
(1983); G. Edward White, Roger Traynor, 69 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1383-84 (1983). See gen-
erally James R. McCall, Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court-Reform and a
Vision of Justice (Aug. 1999) (unpublished book manuscript, available from its author).
84. See John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1643, 1708-10 (1995) (discussing Justice Traynor's perspective on legislative supremacy).
85. See Elizabeth Roth, The Two Voices of Roger Traynor, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
269, 295 (1983) (noting his academic interest in the tax area as well as public service for
state and federal taxing entities during the 1930s). On his contributions in the tax area as
both an academic and a jurist, see Adrian A. Kragen, Chief Justice Traynor and the Law of
Taxation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1984); James E. Sabine, Taxation: A Delicately Planned
Arrangement of Cargo, 53 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1965). Indeed, one of his early opinions
dealing with matters of statutory interpretation was a lengthy dissent in a tax case. See
Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. McColgan, 177 P.2d 757, 764-76 (Cal. 1947) (Traynor, J., dis-
senting).
86. See Roger J. Traynor, Comment on the Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 60 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) ("If in
many fields it is impossible to prophesy forthcoming events and idle to tabulate actual
ones, we must expect our statutory laws to become increasingly pliable to creative judicial
elaboration."); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation and Other Social
Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CAL. L. REV. 207,221 (1965) ("The opinions
dealing with workmen's compensation reveal his capacity for giving new directions and
meaning to parts of a statute which theretofore had been taken too much at face value. Of
course, in some instances, the confinement of the statutory mandates stifled even Justice
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common law bent, his judicial opinions hew closer to the legal process
theories of that era and reflect a decidedly pragmatic cast. The fullest
expression of his views on the subject appeared in 1950, in the major-
ity opinion in People v. Knowles.87 In Knowles, which involved a
statute criminalizing kidnapping, Justice Traynor offered the follow-
ing observations:
An insistence upon judicial regard for the words of a statute does
not imply that they are like words in a dictionary, to be read with
no ranging of the mind. They are no longer at rest in their alpha-
betical bins. Released, combined in phrases that imperfectly com-
municate the thoughts of one man to another, they challenge men
to give them more than passive reading, to consider well their con-
text, to ponder what may be their consequences. Speculation cuts
brush with the pertinent question: what purpose did the Legislature
seek to express as it strung those words into a statute? The court
turns first to the words themselves for the answer. It may also
properly rely on extrinsic aids, the history of the statute, the legisla-
tive debates, committee reports, statements to the voters on initia-
tive and referendum measures. Primarily, however, the words, in
arrangement that superimposes the purpose of the Legislature
upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, re-
minders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was
wittingly undertaken and not to be disregarded. 88
Although one might extract tantalizing hints of endorsement for any
number of approaches, this position steers a middle and pragmatic
Traynor's creativity.").
87. 217 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1950).
88. Id. at 5; see also Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL.
L. REV. 615, 618-20 (1961). These sentiments paralleled those of a great federal jurist
from a previous generation. See Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 370, 375-90 (1947). More than a quarter of a century
after Knowles, Traynor echoed some of the predictions of public choice theory about the
nature of the legislative process:
In the din of a largely urban society, [a legislator] may hear the bellowing of mili-
tant groups or the siren songs of sophisticated special pleaders, but not the mur-
murs of other individuals. He may be quick with a generous dispensation of
public funds to groups for ostensibly worthy projects, so long as such dispensa-
tion attracts little public notice. He is given to assessing the effect of a given ac-
tion upon his chances for re-election. His will for lawmaking is a will of many
wisps. It is the exceptional legislator who is guided by fiat lux rather than the
murky light of ignisfatuus.
Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1977); see also
Roger J. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARK. L. REV. 287, 290 (1967)
("In the legislative process there is neither beginning nor end: It is an endless freewheeling
experiment, without institutional constraints, that may have rational origins and proce-
dures and goals or that may lack them.").
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course between the extremes of textualism and dynamism, preferring
a form of purposivism or what some have called modified intention-
alism.
In most cases, however, Justice Traynor's statutory opinions
made no mention of extrinsic aids to construction, focusing only on
the drafting history behind a particular provision-particularly tracing
revisions of the text over time-to help understand legislative intent
where the words did not provide a plain enough meaning.89 On one
occasion, he did credit affidavits submitted by legislators involved in
the drafting of a statute as a source of relevant guidance.90 Despite an
announced willingness to consider pre-enactment materials, their in-
frequent citation confirms that practical limitations affected the inter-
pretation of state statutes during this period more so than the theo-
retical disputes prominent today in the federal courts. As suggested
in the next Part, a similar factor may help account for the somewhat
counter-intuitive method used to interpret federal regulations that the
United States Supreme Court first announced at around this .same
time.
H. Searching for Administrative Intent
Much like the criticized fiction of a discoverable legislative in-
tent, the notion of a single and authoritative administrative intent en-
counters some conceptual difficulties, though of a different sort.
89. See, e.g., In re Culver, 447 P.2d 633, 634-37 (Cal. 1968); Harvey v. Davis, 444 P.2d
705,709 (Cal. 1968); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 379 P.2d 324,
326 (Cal. 1963); Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 10-12 & n.7 (Cal.
1953); People v. Odle, 230 P.2d 345,347-49 (Cal. 1951); In re Garcia's Estate, 210 P.2d 841,
842-43 (Cal. 1949); Loustalot v. Superior Court, 186 P.2d 673, 676-77 (Cal. 1947); In re
Halcomb, 130 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J., dissenting); see also Roger J.
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401,424 (1968)
("Sometimes a statute has no readily traceable history or even any recorded history at all.
Legislators are under no compulsion to disclose the reasons for a rule, let alone to keep a
chronicle of its origins. Sometimes a statute is enveloped in a history so voluminous or
ambiguous as to be more confusing than revealing."). A citation survey of the court dur-
ing Justice Traynor's tenure did not even bother counting references to statutory materi-
als. See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the
Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 381,381-82 n.2 (1977).
90. See Silver v. Brown, 409 P.2d 689, 692 (Cal. 1966); see also Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1055-56 (Cal. 1972) (struggling to resolve conflicting
post-enactment explanations of intent); Marc R. Perman, Comment, Statutory Interpreta-
tion in California: Individual Testimony as an Extrinsic Aid, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 241, 247-59
(1980) (explaining and criticizing this approach). Other courts have resisted doing so. See,
e.g., Covalt v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1439 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to "import
this isolated practice into federal court"); Picture Rocks Fire Dist. v. Pima County, 733
P.2d 639, 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a state senator's deposition could not be
admitted as evidence of legislative intent).
Many agency officials may have a hand in the formulation of a legisla-
tive rule, and the Supreme Court has accepted the reality that the
head of an agency must subdelegate work to subordinates. 91 With
multi-member commissions, these problems become still trickier-
perhaps akin to the difficulty of interpreting a plurality decision by
the Supreme Court-but the same hierarchical structure and duty of
explanation distinguishes all administrative agencies from the
collective decisionmaking process of a legislature.
The head of such an entity does not simply exercise something
akin to the veto available to the President when Congress presents
him with legislation for signature. As some defenders of using legisla-
tive history have noted, the law readily ascribes intent to hierarchical
organizations such as corporations.92 Although perhaps inapt as an
analogy to collective bodies such as legislatures,93 the parallel works
in the administrative context. At the same time, the insights of public
choice theory that have inspired the textualist critique of the legisla-
tive process seem less apt for understanding agency behavior.94 Fi-
91. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468,481 (1936); see also United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
379 F.2d 453,461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1967); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 126-55 (2d
ed. 1999) (discussing the institutional nature of agency decisionmaking during rulemak-
ing); Peter L. Strauss, Disqualifications of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 990,994 (1980) (same).
92. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 49, at 864-66; Zeppos, supra note 48, at 1341-42. See
generally V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of
Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999).
93. See Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of
the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1171, 1184-86
(1998) (arguing that the largely intentionalist approach to contract interpretation makes
no sense as an interpretive method for legislation produced by a collective body and de-
signed to regulate the affairs of others).
94. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
490, 496 (1996) (summarizing the limitations of public choice theory in predicting the be-
havior of unelected officials). Even if agency officials do not behave like legislators seek-
ing to maximize their re-election chances, they may act in ways designed to enhance their
own power and flexibility. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delega-
tion, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 51 (1982) ("Budget maximizing, jurisdictional expansion, and
output maximizing in their various manifestations may increase private payoffs to agency
personnel."). They also face similar forms of lobbying by interested parties. See Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 53-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (objecting to lobbying during
rulemaking); Manning, supra note 7, at 676-80 (arguing that excessive deference may ac-
centuate these tendencies); Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 34 (1995) (In applying Noerr-Pennington antitrust
immunity for petitions directed to government agencies, "courts have distinguished be-
tween legislative and adjudicatory decisionmaking because the standards of acceptable
conduct are said to vary substantially in the two arenas."); id. at 51 (explaining the view
that the rules of professional conduct for attorneys do not apply during agency rulemak-
ing).
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nally, though agencies may engage in obfuscation, choosing to com-
municate their decisions using formats designed to evade procedural
or substantive constraints on the exercise of their powers,95 this would
complicate but should not scuttle efforts to divine regulatory intent.
As argued herein, it is far easier to ascribe an intent to an agency
when it issues a rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both
because of differences in their decisionmaking routines and because
of the greater reliability of the materials that document the bases for
their decisions. Why then do courts seem so much less preoccupied
with administrative intent and consulting regulatory histories than
when they search for legislative intent in pre-enactment statutory ma-
terials? Does this reflect a greater preference for textualism when
applied to regulations or an acceptance of a form of dynamic interpre-
tation entrusted to agency officials rather than judges? This Part sug-
gests that, instead of deferring so readily to an agency's post-
promulgation interpretation, courts should prefer intentionalism-
whatever its drawbacks as a method of statutory construction-when
asked to interpret legislative rules.
A. Administrative Records and Legislative Fact-Finding
Records of legislative and administrative consideration of a pro-
posal provide potentially critical information wholly apart from pos-
sible guidance about intended meaning. Most importantly, when re-
viewing a substantive challenge to a regulation, a court looks for
evidence and explanation in the record compiled by the agency.96
Post hoc rationalizations generally will not suffice.97 Because the
95. See Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211-13
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("Divining agency intent is rarely a simple matter, for bureaucratic boilerplate often ob-
scures the true purpose."); Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?"
Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31,
35-38 (1992); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 873, 876-78, 898, 922-23 (identifying various
bureaucratic ruses designed to circumvent statutory constraints).
96. See infra note 203 (discussing the evolution of "hard look" review). In contrast,
several state courts continue to engage in fairly deferential review of state administrative
rulemaking under a minimum rationality standard. See William Funk, Rationality Review
of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 153-60 (1991); see also Pacific
States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (applying a minimum ra-
tionality test where a state agency's order was challenged on substantive due process
grounds).
97. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50
(1983) ("[Cjourts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency
action."); Consumers Fed'n of Am. v. HHS, 83 F.3d 1497, 1506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (re-
jecting as a post hoc rationalization an expert declaration submitted by the agency in de-
fense of its rule); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419-20 (1971) (same, in a challenge to informal adjudication); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL.,
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prohibits agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion," 98 a rule must pur-
port to serve some public regarding purpose whatever political im-
peratives may have really motivated the agency.99 Thus, unlike legis-
lation, an identifiable and defensible purpose must underlie legislative
rules. Finally, when assessing an equal protection challenge to agency
action, a court may look at the "administrative history" to determine
whether some discriminatory intent motivated the decision.1°°
Similarly, when reviewing certain constitutional challenges to a
statute, a court may look at findings of legislative fact and underlying
motive.101 When engaged in minimum rationality review, however,
courts will presume an intent to pursue legitimate ends. °2 Unlike
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 758-59 (4th ed. 1998) (questioning the judicial insistence on con-
temporaneous rationalizations). By comparison, courts often accept post hoc interpreta-
tions when an agency seeks to enforce an ambiguous rule. See infra notes 105-106, 176,
and accompanying text.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1994).
99. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 857-58 (1984) ("In 1981 a new
administration took office and... the EPA reevaluated the various arguments that had
been advanced in connection with the proper definition of the term 'source' . .. ."); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42 (holding that "an agency changing its course by re-
scinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change"); id. at 59
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The agency's changed view of
the [passive restraint] standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a
different political party.... [I]t is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration."); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Under Chevron "there is no barrier
to an agency altering its initial interpretation to adopt another reasonable interpretation-
even one that represents a new policy response generated by a different administration.");
Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 585-86
(1985) (same).
100. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 (1977) ("The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant [in deter-
mining whether discriminatory intent existed], especially where there are contemporary
statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.");
see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV.
297, 368-69 (1997) (concluding that the Court has increasingly and appropriately, though
inconsistently, focused on the legislature's motivations in resolving constitutional chal-
lenges); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (defending the tradition of fairly limited judicial inquiries into
governmental motivation).
101. In addition to equal protection challenges, see id., inquiries into subjective motiva-
tions also may take place in First Amendment challenges to legislation, see Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-42 (1993) (invalidating city
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices on free exercise grounds because they evidently
reflected animosity toward a particular religion); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-
96 (1987) (invalidating a state statute requiring that schools teach creationism alongside
theories of evolution on establishment clause grounds). But see id. at 636-39 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to such an inquiry into subjective legislative motivation).
102. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) ("[B]ecause we
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federal agencies engaged in rulemaking, legislatures generally need
not develop an explanatory record in anticipation of substantive judi-
cial review or in order to provide notice to the public.103 Nonetheless,
in some instances the absence of necessary findings may lead courts to
invalidate a statute, most recently in challenges to congressional exer-
cises of the power to regulate interstate commerce. 104 In these cases,
judges may consult a range of pre-enactment legislative materials.
Given the well-established use of these records, especially in the ad-
ministrative context, the seeming judicial disinterest in using these
same materials when construing-as opposed to reviewing-agency
rules makes little sense.
B. The Tradition of Deference to Post-Promulgation Interpretations
Ironically, when interpreting regulations, courts appear to give
the most credence to post-promulgation expressions of agency intent,
precisely the converse of the view that post-enactment expressions of
legislative intent deserve little if any weight.105 Courts have long de-
ferred to agency interpretations of ambiguities in their legislative
rules.1°6 As the Supreme Court explained in 1965, "[w]hen the con-
never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely ir-
relevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged dis-
tinction actually motivated the legislature."); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("[T]his Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate
its reasons for enacting a statute.").
103. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Constitution does not require that legislation "be supported by com-
mittee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote"). For an extended
argument that Congress nonetheless owes citizens some explanation for its decisions, see
Bell, supra note 72, at 9-47.
104. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) ("Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on in-
terstate commerce... [but such] findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-
ment .... "); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 844-52
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (declining to defer to legislative findings of interstate effects in
the Violence Against Women Act), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 11 (Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5);
see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1, 154-57 (1971) (deferring to legislative
findings); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring
Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731, 742, 746 (1996) (cautioning that a de-
mand for congressional findings may encourage courts to engage in something akin to
"hard look" review of agency records, but concluding that the countervailing benefits may
justify such demands whenever Congress legislates at or near constitutional boundaries).
See generally Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The Illusion of Certainty," 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1723 (1995).
105. See supra note 78-79.
106. See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Anderson Bros. Ford v.
Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-
66 (1980); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 484 & n.19
(1979); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-73 (1977); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv.
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struction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in is-
sue, deference is even more clearly in order." 107 In essence, dynamic
interpretation (though exercised by agencies instead of courts), 08
rather than either textualism or intentionalism, has been the norm for
judicial interpretation of legislative rules. This stands in sharp con-
trast to the judiciary's evident continuing preference for one of the
originalist approaches in matters of statutory interpretation.
In 1945, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,109 the United
States Supreme Court provided the classic and oft-quoted statement
of this rule of deference:
Since this [case] involves an interpretation of an administrative
regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative con-
struction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in
doubt.... [T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpreta-
tion, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erro-
neous or inconsistent with the regulation.... Our only tools, there-
fore, are the plain words of the regulation and any relevant
interpretations of the Administrator."
0
The fact that the Court's most prominent initial expression of
this rule pre-dated the enactment of the APA by one year may help
Co. v. Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 14-15 (1975) (per curiam); Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v.
Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,276 (1969).
107. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). State agencies also may receive such def-
erence in construing their own regulations. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 959 F.2d 149, 152-53 (9th Cir. 1992); Eager v. Florida Keys
Aqueduct Auth., 580 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Morton v. Missouri Air
Conservation Comm'n, 944 S.W.2d 231,238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
108. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common
Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1056, 1060 (1998) (describing dynamic interpretation of
statutes as "an administrative task, not a judicial one"). For a highly critical response to
this argument, see Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463. Even if one agrees with Professor
Sunstein's claim, however, it does not necessarily support the affiliated suggestion that
federal agencies, which have the power to update their own regulations more directly
through promulgating an amendment, should have the freedom to interpret their rules in a
dynamic fashion. Nonetheless, a rule of strong deference may reflect the Court's limited
opportunity to supervise agency decisionmaking and the potentially conflicting lower
court interpretations of uniform federal regulations, as some have suggested to explain
Chevron deference for enabling statutes. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 (1987).
109. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
110. Id. at 413-14; see also Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35
CAL. L. REv. 509,515-16,520-22,542-44 (1947) (drawing comparisons between the search
for legislative and administrative intent, and generally supporting a rule of deference to
agency interpretations as superior to the use of extrinsic aids and canons of construction).
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account for its deferential approach because judges would have had
no useful pre-promulgation materials to consult when asked to inter-
pret an unclear agency rule."' Although the Federal Register Act,"2
enacted in 1935, demanded publication and codification of final
regulations,1 3 the extensive explanatory materials found in the Fed-
eral Register nowadays simply did not exist at that time. In 1946, the
APA reinforced the requirement that agencies publish legislative
rules in the Federal Register.114 In fact, even after the enactment of
the APA, decades passed before agencies published meaningful pre-
ambles with their final regulations." 5 Like the traditional English
rule against consulting parliamentary materials, which may have
rested in part on the sparse documentation of legislative debates that
111. The Court did refer to an agency "bulletin" published in the Federal Register im-
mediately after issuance of the rule that sought to explain it to the industry. See Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. One should also note that the reference to this and other consistent
interpretations came only after the Court engaged in a careful textual analysis. See id.
("Any doubts concerning this interpretation of rule (i) are removed by reference to the
administrative construction...."). Lastly, a different contextual factor may account for
the announced rule of substantial deference (even if the Court did not really apply it in
that fashion): the regulation imposed a price freeze necessitated by World War II. See id.
at 413; cf. Manning, supra note 7, at 616-17 ("Seminole Rock may be an understandable
reaction to the exigencies of modem regulatory governance; it cuts agencies helpful inter-
pretive slack in a world in which life is short, resources are limited, and agencies must ad-
dress complex issues that have unpredictable twists and turns." (footnote omitted)). A
number of the more recent decisions deferring to post-promulgation interpretations of
agency rules have a similar genesis, in this case the energy and inflationary crises of the
1970s, and were issued by a specialized lower federal court. For a criticism of its track re-
cord, see James R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113, 151 ("The TECA has abdicated
its judicial responsibility by its deference to administrative agencies, its failure to secure
agency compliance with procedural safeguards and its unwillingness to closely scrutinize
the series of emergency economic regulatory programs which were spawned during the
1970's.").
112. See ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511
(1994)); see also United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (recounting the impetus for the creation of the Federal Register). By way of
comparison, the Congressional Record dates back to the 1840s. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771
F.2d 539,541 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
113. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1510 (1994); see also 1 C.F.R. §§ 1-22 (1999) (implementing
regulations); Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations-A Reap-
praisal, 80 HARV. L. REV. 439 (1966) (providing a generally favorable assessment of initial
experience with these sources for administrative materials).
114. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(D), 553(b) (1994); see also Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendation No. 76-2, Strengthening the Informational and No-
tice-Giving Functions of the "Federal Register," 41 Fed. Reg. 29,653, 29,653-54 (1976);
Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register: An Analysis of the Publi-
cation Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41
ADMIN. L. REv. 533 (1989).
115. See infra Part II.D.1.
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existed in that country,116 or the infrequent reference to legislative
histories for state statutes, the failure to consult regulatory histories
may have emerged from similar practical considerations. Given the
ready availability of such materials today, courts should rethink this
rule of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations.
Nonetheless, recent Supreme Court decisions confirm the highly
deferential approach. Apart from a handful of opinions that make
passing references to the ingrained rule of deference," 7 a pair of the
Court's latest decisions, both 5-4 splits, have highlighted its applica-
tion and pitfalls. In 1994, in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,118
the majority sustained a ruling by the Health Care Financing Admini-
stration (HCFA) to deny Medicare reimbursement to a teaching hos-
pital of certain educational costs incurred by its affiliated medical
school. First, the Court reiterated its longstanding approach to re-
viewing such cases: "We must give substantial deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations.... [W]e must defer to
the Secretary's interpretation unless an 'alternative reading is com-
pelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation." ' 119 In
resolving the dispute, the majority accepted the agency's construction
because it found no ambiguity in the text of the applicable regula-
tion,120 so the Court had no occasion to inquire about the agency's
original intent. The four dissenters, however, found ambiguity in the
rule, and they also would have rejected HCFA's interpretation as un-
reasonable.'2'
The following year, the Court decided Shalala v. Guernsey Me-
morial Hospital,22 another case dealing with HCFA's Medicare re-
imbursement rules. The dispute turned on whether an informal
guideline calling for the amortization of a hospital's defeasance costs
conflicted with a regulation that appeared to provide for reimburse-
116. See Baade, supra note 15, at 1009, 1011-12 (questioning the extent to which this
was really a factor).
117. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36,45,47 (1993); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110-12 (1992); Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,705-06 (1991); INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc.,
502 U.S. 183, 189-91 (1991); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991); Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director,
OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986); see also Russell
L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations:
A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 411 (1992).
118. 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
119. Id. at 512 (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).
120. See id. at 514-15, 518 (concluding that "the Secretary's construction of the anti-
redistribution principle is faithful to the regulation's plain language").
121. See id. at 518-19,525-31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
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ment according to generally accepted accounting principles, which
would have allowed for immediate recovery of the full amount of this
loss.'23 This time the majority expressed less confidence that the text
of the regulation lacked any ambiguity, though it found plain meaning
by looking at the context surrounding the text in question, including
the organization of the subparts in the relevant section and their ti-
tles. 24 Once again, four members of the Court disagreed (though
only two of them had also dissented in Thomas Jefferson), taking a
contrary view of the text and structure of the regulation in question
and, therefore, concluding that the guideline amounted to an imper-
missible attempt by HCFA to amend rather than interpret its existing
legislative rule.125
Without becoming bogged down in the complexities of the par-
ticular Medicare regulations, which may explain the readiness of the
majorities in both cases to defer,126 this pair of recent decisions illus-
trates a couple of broader points. First, as others have noted in con-
nection with statutory interpretation cases, reasonable minds may
disagree about the plain meaning of a regulation as well as the
threshold of ambiguity before a court must defer to an agency's con-
struction. Second, the Supreme Court generally makes no effort to
consult a regulation's administrative history for extrinsic aids to inter-
pretation,127 though, in contrast to some of its opinions rejecting re-
123. See id. at 89-92.
124. See id. at 93-94; id. at 94 ("The logical sequence of a regulation or a part of it can
be significant in interpreting its meaning.... The Secretary's position... is supported by
the regulation's text.., and structure .... "). The majority also concluded that the agency
had adopted a "sensible" approach, see id. at 101, even though the substantive merits of
the guideline were not at issue; the only question was whether the guideline simply inter-
preted or instead impermissibly attempted to amend the underlying legislative rule.
125. See id. at 104-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 110-11 ("An agency is bound by
the regulations it promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the amendment process
through substantive changes recorded in an informal policy manual that are unsupported
by the language of the regulation."). The dissenters also emphasized an apparent inconsis-
tency with HCFA's earlier view that the rule had adopted generally accepted accounting
principles. See id. at 106.
126. Cf. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 707-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for failing to undertake the effort to locate the plain meaning of a complex rule
from its text and structure).
127. The dissenting opinion in Thomas Jefferson University did quote from two HCFA
Federal Register notices, though both post-dated the promulgation of the regulation in
question, see 512 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and it also looked to the "regula-
tory history" of another challenged regulation, though this inquiry simply compared the
text of that regulation to the predecessor versions of the rule that it had amended, see id.
at 530-31. In an earlier case, by comparison, Justices Marshall and Brennan described the
preamble to an agency rule as "strong evidence of regulatory intent" that contradicted the
agency's current interpretation. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135,
165 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 427 n.13
& 428 n.14 (1988) (evaluating the drafting history of the regulations in question).
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course to legislative history, without any apparent explanation for ig-
noring such materials. The dissents in both of these cases warned that
deferring too readily to such post-promulgation interpretations might
give agencies an incentive to issue excessively vague legislative rules
so as to retain maximum future flexibility.18 "[T]he Secretary has
merely replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity. It is
perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague
regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the
agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process."'129
Notwithstanding this cautionary note, lower federal courts have
gotten the message about deferring,130 explaining that agencies re-
ceive even greater deference when interpreting their own regulations
than they do under Chevron when interpreting ambiguous language
in their enabling statutes.131 Although intoning a plain meaning ap-
proach, which usually allows reference to extrinsic materials in the
event of textual ambiguity, many judges simply inquire whether the
128. See Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 104, 108-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Robert A. Anthony,
"Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8
ADMIN. L.J. 1, 6 n.21 (1994) ("If the relevant language of the existing document consists
of vague or vacuous terms... the process of announcing propositions that specify applica-
tions of those terms is not ordinarily one of interpretation, because those terms in them-
selves do not supply substance from which the propositions can be derived.").
129. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Manning,
supra note 7, at 647-48 ("[W]hen a lawmaker controls the interpretation of its own laws,
an important incentive for adopting transparent and self-limiting rules is lost because any
discretion created by an imprecise, vague, or ambiguous law inures to the very entity that
created it."); id. at 655 ("[S]ince the agency can say what its own regulations mean (unless
the agency's view is plainly erroneous), the agency bears little, if any, risk of its own opac-
ity or imprecision."); cf. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A substantive regulation must have sufficient content and definitiveness
as to be a meaningful exercise in agency lawmaking. It is certainly not open to an agency
to promulgate mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal
'interpretations."').
130. See, e.g., Electronic Eng'g Co. v. FCC, 140 F.3d 1045, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1998); State
of New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1997); Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239,
1246 (Fed. Cir. 1997); MobileTel, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.3d 888, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Oth-
ers previously have noted this effect in statutory cases, finding that, at least initially, the
lower courts took Chevron more seriously than the Supreme Court did in subsequent
cases. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30-31, 47 (1998); Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-84 (1992);
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott., To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Fed-
eral Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984,1058-59.
131. See, e.g., Freeman Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994); cf. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 584 (sug-
gesting that, as Chevron deference has increased, the two standards actually have con-
verged).
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agency's interpretation of the text is plainly erroneous rather than at-
tempting to determine its original intent. They seem largely uncon-
cerned that this creates incentives for agencies to promulgate exces-
sively vague legislative rules that leave the more difficult task of
specification to the more flexible and unaccountable process of later
"interpreting" these open-ended regulations.
C. The Continuing Relevance of Original Agency Intent
Even with this deeply ingrained tradition of deference, courts
may have to search for an agency's original intent in order to deter-
mine whether the latest view espoused by the incumbent administra-
tion deserves to be regarded as authoritative. Rather than largely
abandoning the rule of deference, as at least one commentator has
suggested,132 courts could assume a greater role in applying the rea-
sonableness requirement by paying closer attention to the text of an
existing rule and also giving at least some attention to its regulatory
history before accepting the agency's current reading. Agencies
would not lose all flexibility to adopt evolving interpretations, but
they would face greater constraints on the range of permissible read-
ings of their own regulations than they do at present. This more cau-
tious approach might parallel what the Supreme Court has done re-
cently when it resolves more Chevron questions at step one,133
132. See Manning, supra note 7, at 680-90 (advocating that Seminole Rock's strong form
of deference be substituted with an approach more similar to old-style Skidmore deference
for agency interpretations of statutes, which would instruct courts to reach an independent
judgment about the meaning of a regulation while taking into account and assigning ap-
propriate weight to whatever expertise or persuasive arguments an agency might have to
offer). But cf. Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification: A Harder
Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 667, 686-88 (1996) (incor-
rectly suggesting that Skidmore's weak deference remains the standard for reviewing in-
terpretive rules, whether they construe language in a statute or a legislative rule, though
their emphasis on the format in which the interpretation is issued as opposed to the char-
acter of the document subject to interpretation may account for this mistake). For one
rare recent example of a court using the Skidmore test in reviewing an agency's interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous regulation, see Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d
1060, 1070-73 (1st Cir. 1995). See also Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 453 & n.13 (3d Cir.
1994). Other opinions do, of course, reflect varying degrees of deference, but they gener-
ally enunciate a more forgiving standard of review and, in practice, usually give the
agency's view controlling weight.
133. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927,
938-40 (1998); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218,225-29 (1994); Maislin
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also Merrill, supra
note 28, at 366-73 (explaining why the ascendancy of textualism appears to be reducing
deference to agency interpretations). But cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism
and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 417-23
(1996) (refuting claims that textualism has systematically distorted the Court's application
of Chevron).
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occasionally even consulting legislative history to decide that Con-
gress thereby had spoken unambiguously to the precise question at
issue.134
As explained in the sections that follow, an agency's original in-
tent might matter in several ways. First, in any number of contexts,
expressions of intent found in pre-enactment materials could provide
a benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of an agency's post-
promulgation interpretation of ambiguities in the text of a legislative
rule. Second, and more particularly, attention to original intent could
help courts enforce the APA's procedural requirements governing
the amendment of a regulation. Third, because agencies may not ap-
pear in litigation where questions about the meaning of their rules
arise, they may not be in a position to offer courts post-promulgation
guidance. Finally, treating administrative history as reliable guidance
addresses the concern that regulated parties receive fair notice of
their legal rights and obligations. Although these contexts and uses
overlap, they help illustrate the many situations in which pre-
promulgation materials can assist in the interpretive process.
(1) Providing a Benchmark for Evaluating Interpretations
An agency's interpretation of its own regulations must be mini-
mally reasonable. Verbal formulations of the degree of deference
vary, ranging from the "plainly erroneous" test that the Supreme
Court has emphasized to a more skeptical version that considers in-
consistencies with earlier interpretations and the quality of the
agency's explanation for its latest construction of a regulation. What-
ever the announced standard, courts show tremendous deference in
practice, though on occasion they have rejected agency interpreta-
tions as unreasonable. 35 More importantly for present purposes,
most courts suggest measuring the agency's interpretation only
against the unadorned text of the regulation, others refer to both the
text and underlying purpose, and only a few add mention of the
agency's intent at the time that it promulgated the regulation.136 Al-
134. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-50 (1987); see also Cleveland
v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361,1366 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 579-85 (1981); id. at 588-95 (White,
J., dissenting); Stone v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Guard v. NRC,
753 F.2d 1144,1148-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
136. For examples of the latter formulation, see In re Transcon Lines, 89 F.3d 559, 567
(9th Cir. 1996); SSM Rehab. Inst. v. Shalala, 68 F.3d 266, 269-71 (8th Cir. 1995) (relying on
agency statements in the preamble accompanying the rule in question, and rejecting a
hospital's attempt to contradict these with statements in a subsequent preamble explaining
a proposed amendment to the regulation); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342, 344
(4th Cir. 1995); Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1101, 1105
(Mass. 1994) (evaluating the text, context, and history in order to determine what the state
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though not reflected in its practice, the latter formulation most closely
approximates the Supreme Court's announced guidance. 37 As one
lower court explained, only if it could not find a plain meaning of the
text, and if the agency had not later provided any interpretation to
which it could defer, would the court bother to inquire about the his-
tory and purpose of the regulation.138 Thus, some judges seek out
original agency intent in rulemaking only as a last resort.
Deference only comes into play if the meaning of a regulation is
"doubtful or ambiguous.' 39 In searching for the plain meaning of a
regulation, courts sometimes deploy textualist conventions such as
canons of construction.140 Thus, judges usually prefer interpretations
that avoid possible constitutional conflicts.141 For instance, just as the
Supreme Court has imposed a clear statement rule when Congress
wishes to preempt state law in order to protect values of federalism, it
agency "had in mind" when issuing a regulation). '
137. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415,430 (1988) ("[W]e are properly hesitant to
substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading is com-
pelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation." (emphasis added) (quoted with approval in
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994))); Jewett v. Commissioner,
455 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) ("[T]he text of the Regulation supports the Commissioner's in-
terpretation. Because that text is not entirely clear, however, it is appropriate to examine
briefly the Regulation's history."). Although this language usefully draws attention to an
agency's original intent, how often will a court feel "compelled" on this basis to reject an
agency's subsequent interpretation? For one such rare case, see S. G. Loewendick & Sons,
Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1291,1295 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
138. See United States v. Heller, 726 F.2d 756, 762 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983); id. at
763 ("Finding the rule's language ambiguous, and receiving no administrative guidance,
we turn to the regulation's history and purpose."); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 538-39 & n.29 (1982) (looking to the preamble for evidence of agency
"intent" only after finding no consistent post-promulgation agency interpretation to which
to defer); Cash v. Conn Appliances, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891 (E.D. Tex. 1997) ("If the
Administrator offers no statement settling the rule's meaning, then a court resorts to other
interpretive tools.").
139. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 F.3d 842, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see
also id. at 853 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("[D]eference is not due when the agency's interpreta-
tion flatly contradicts the only sensible reading of an unambiguous regulation."); Clean
Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328,333 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that an agency's interpreta-
tion was inconsistent with the plain meaning of its regulation); KCMC, Inc. v. FCC, 600
F.2d 546, 549-52 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
140. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707-08, 712-13, 719 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging the use of the expressio unius canon in interpreting a regula-
tion); Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1995); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple In-
vestor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995); Black & Decker Corp. v. Commissioner,
986 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Regulations, like statutes, are interpreted according to
canons of construction."); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir.
1982); Weaver & Schweitzer, supra note 117, at 432-37.
141. See, e.g., Comet Enterprises Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir.
1997).
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has applied a similar rule of construction to agency regulations that
arguably sought to displace state law, though in this context the Court
has endorsed references to pre-promulgation materials to discern an
intent to preempt.142 In some cases, courts also consult dictionaries,143
though the lexicographic fetishism that has emerged recently in statu-
tory interpretation cases has not yet really filtered down to the inter-
pretation of ambiguous regulations. Even so, whatever use that
judges may make of textualist tools of construction when confronting
an unclear legislative rule, their understanding of original agency in-
tent may affect the reasonableness determination. 144 For instance,
courts that emphasize text but also express wariness about inconsis-
tent interpretations may look to the agency's original expression of
intent as the more reliable contemporaneous explanation of a regula-
tion.145
142. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716-18
(1985) (declining to infer an agency's intent to preempt based solely on the promulgation
of comprehensive regulations in the field); id. at 718 ("[B]ecause agencies normally ad-
dress problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety of means, including
regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments, we can ex-
pect that they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be ex-
clusive."); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 158 (1982) ("Any
ambiguity in [the regulation's] language is dispelled by the preamble accompanying and
explaining the regulation. The preamble unequivocally expresses the Board's determina-
tion to displace state law."); Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050,1053-54
(8th Cir. 1998); Industrial Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311-14 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding clear OSHA intent that its regulation would preempt state law, especially in the
preamble accompanying the final rule); Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d
615, 621-23 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding no such clear intent in the CPSC's failure to issue any
regulations); see also Jack W. Campbell, IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron
Era, 59 U. PrrT. L. REv. 805, 834, 844 (1998) ("Unless the agency has clearly stated its in-
tent to preempt the field, the court should uphold the challenged state law absent an ac-
tual conflict with the federal regulations.").
143. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing a pair of dictionaries to
confirm that a phrase "comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns"); Rocky Mtn.
Radar, Inc. v. FCC, 158 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1998); Walker Stone Co. v. Secretary of
Labor, 156 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (10th Cir. 1998); Empire Co. v. OSHRC, 136 F.3d 873, 878
& n.2 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Tenzer, 127 F.3d 222,226 (2d Cir. 1997); Gore, Inc.
v. Espy, 87 F.3d 767,773 (5th Cir. 1996).
144. See Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The
Deference Rule, 45 U. Prrr. L Rnv. 587, 615 (1984) (explaining that a court should "de-
terminea whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable and whether it is consistent
with the regulation's language and purpose, and the agency's intent (to the extent ascer-
tainable) as of the date the regulation was promulgated").
145. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 104, 106 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the inconsistency in the agency's interpretations
of its regulation); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515-16 (1994) (con-
ceding that an agency interpretation of a regulation that conflicts with a prior interpreta-
tion should receive considerably less deference, but finding no such earlier post-
promulgation interpretation that conflicted with the agency's current considered view);
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(2) Enforcing the APA's Rulemaking Procedures
In one of its recent separation-of-powers decisions, the Supreme
Court took the following position: "If the power is legislative, Con-
gress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements of Art. I, § 7."146 In parallel, one could say
that, if the power is legislative rulemaking, agencies must exercise it in
conformity with the notice-and-comment requirements of APA §
553.147 Indeed, to grant "controlling weight" to agency interpreta-
tions of their own regulations unless such constructions are "plainly
erroneous," as the Supreme Court has instructed ever since Seminole
Rock,148 may conflict with separation-of-powers principles by lodging
primary and largely conclusive interpretive power in the same entity
that exercises the lawmaking function. 49
Whatever one's view of the seriousness of this constitutional ob-
jection, the stated rationale for treating agency interpretations as
authoritative rests on the debatable ground that current officials can
best identify their predecessors' original intent,150 rather than the sug-
Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to defer to
an agency's "shockingly inconsistent" interpretation of its own regulation).
146. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,276 (1991); accord Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091,
2103-04,2108 (1998).
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c) (1994); see also Manning, supra note 7, at 694 ("If the
Court were to overturn Seminole Rock, agencies would no longer be in a position to enjoy
the often-substantial benefits of rulemaking without bearing the full deliberative-process
costs that the APA contemplates.").
148. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945).
149. See Manning, supra note 7, at 631 ("By permitting agencies both to write regula-
tions and to construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies lawmaking
and law-exposition-a combination of powers decisively rejected by our constitutional
structure."); id. at 654 (same); see also id. at 639, 696 (distinguishing this form of deference
from Chevron, which simply reallocated the power to interpret properly enacted congres-
sional legislation from courts to agencies). If correct, one could lodge a similar objection
to the rules of procedure that the Supreme Court both formulates and interprets (as de-
scribed below), an issue that Professor Manning does not confront. Cf id. at 648 n.175
(distinguishing the judiciary's subsequent interpretation of its own precedents from agency
interpretations of their regulations).
150. See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991) (explaining that the agency "is
in a better position... to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in question," in part
because of its "historical familiarity"); 1 KENNETH GULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d ed. 1994) (referring to the
"common sense" notion underlying this well-settled rule of deference that an "agency
typically is in a superior position to determine what it intended when it issued a rule, how
and when it intended the rule to apply, and the interpretation that makes the most sense
given the agency's purposes in issuing the rule"); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We do not defer, however, to an
administrative agency's interpretation solely because its employees are the drafters and
presumably have superior knowledge as to what they intended.... [T]he doctrine of def-
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gestion that current officials can better adapt the rule to new circum-
stances.151 Otherwise, courts would condone efforts to avoid notice-
and-comment rulemaking requirements.152 As several members of
the Supreme Court have explained in recent dissenting opinions,
"[a]n agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and may not
attempt to circumvent the amendment process through substantive
changes recorded in an informal policy manual that are unsupported
by the language of the regulation.' 1 53
Courts allow agencies to alter interpretations of their enabling
statutes so long as they justify such revisions. 5 4 This recognizes the
fact that Congress often delegates policymaking responsibilities to
agencies but generally not the power to alter the statutory language
directly 55 In contrast, agencies do enjoy the power to amend their
erence is based primarily on the agency's statutory role as the sponsor of the regulation,
not necessarily on its drafting expertise."); Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 117
F.3d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (deferring to FERC's interpretation of rules authored by
the ICC but then transferred to it by Congress).
151. See, e.g., Pettibone Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 536, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (re-
jecting the IRS's claim that it could update an obsolete regulation by reinterpreting it).
But cf. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151 ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking pre-
rogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers."); Melanie E. Walker, Com-
ment, Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1353-56 (1999) (urging that courts justify deference to agencies' inter-
pretations of their regulations on grounds of an implied congressional delegation to do so
rather than on their superior knowledge and expertise).
152. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1994) (defining rulemaking to include "amending, or re-
pealing a rule"); Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996); National Family Plan-
ning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235-40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding
that an agency could not "amend" a rule through interpretation); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 777 F.2d 751,759 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
153. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110-11 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting); see also id. at 111 (emphasizing that interpretive rules "must explain existing law
and not contradict what the regulations require"); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Together, these two dissents reflect the
views of six members of the current Court, and the majority opinions in both cases did not
question their basic premise.
154. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) ("The Secretary is
not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken
legal interpretation."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1990); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) ("An initial agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone."); David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Re-
vised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. C i. L. REV. 681 (1997); cf. Department of
Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765,778 (1999) (rejecting
an agency's revised interpretation of the Census Act as allowing statistical sampling in
light of its long-standing interpretation to the contrary).
155. In rare instances, Congress has given agencies the power to modify statutory re-
quirements directly. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(i)(5)(A) (1994) (IRS); 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2)
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own regulations if necessitated by changed circumstances, in which
case amendatory "interpretations" of legislative rules should be less
acceptable than revised administrative interpretations of statutory
language.156 Thus, the relative ease of amending a regulation through
informal rulemaking procedures, at least as compared to the inertia
and other difficulties encountered by Congress,157 should make judges
less shy about interpreting an ambiguous legislative rule according to
the agency's original intent as expressed in pre-promulgation materi-
als.158 If a legislative rule must evolve to meet unforeseen contingen-
(1994) (FCC); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (FRCP).
156. See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting
that agencies deserve somewhat less freedom to construe their own regulations through
the issuance of interpretive rules than they have in the case of statutes because,
"[o]therwise, the agency could evade its notice and comment obligation by 'modifying' a
substantive rule that was promulgated by notice and comment rulemaking"); American
Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 F.3d 842, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting)
("The Commission presumably may take appropriate measures to amend or replace the
offending provisions. But those measures should not include reading the current provision
to say what it plainly does not say."); Beazer East, Inc. v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603, 611 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1992) (same); cf. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585-86
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (arguing that the rules of deference to agency interpretations of ambigui-
ties in both statutes and regulations rest on the same rationale of an implicit delegation of
lawmaking authority, but recognizing that the analogy is not complete because the APA
requires notice-and-comment procedures when agencies seek to exercise that delegated
power).
157. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Pas4 Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 453 (1986)
(explaining that the informal rulemaking procedures originally had been designed as a less
cumbersome method for legislating); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decision-
makers and the Preferred Scope of Political Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296, 328 (1993)
(noting that it is relatively easier for agencies to make federal law than it is for Congress).
Obviously, agencies find it easiest to "amend" a regulation by reinterpretation rather than
through rulemaking, which has become more cumbersome over time. Moreover, a num-
ber of the deferential decisions on this question arose in the wage and price control con-
text, where agencies needed to react quickly in the face of changing conditions. Nonethe-
less, the APA's good cause exception exists to allow streamlined rulemaking procedures in
cases of genuine necessity. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1994); see also Lars Noah, Doubts
About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. Rnv. 401, 412-16 (1999) (criticizing recent
efforts to use this exception routinely to avoid notice-and-comment procedures for non-
controversial regulations).
158. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284, 291-92 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that the agency failed to justify an interpretation of its regulation which con-
flicted with the explanation that it had provided in the preamble accompanying the final
regulation); Director, OWCP v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F-3d 141, 147 (3d Cir.
1995) ("The responsibility to promulgate clear and unambiguous standards is on the Sec-
retary.... If the language is faulty, the Secretary has the means and the obligation to
amend."); United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995)
(same). This differentiates the construction of agency rules from the rationale for dynamic
judicial interpretation of statutes. See supra note 65; see also Henry J. Friendly, The Gap
in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787,
792-802 (1963) (lamenting Congress's failure to revisit and revise flawed statutes).
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cies, the agency has the means at its disposal to revise the regulation
directly, so courts need not tolerate the subterfuge of a newly revised
interpretation of the original text to accomplish the same end.
The line between permissible and amendatory interpretations is,
of course, difficult to define. At the extremes, a document that simply
restates and reminds parties of an existing legislative rule need not
again undergo the previously completed rulemaking procedures,
159
while a document that contradicts an existing regulation would have
to satisfy these procedures in order to rescind the old rule.16° Be-
tween these poles lie documents that clarify ambiguities in-or pro-
vide some refinement of-the text of an existing regulation,161 and
those that supplement an existing regulation by filling gaps though
not directly altering the meaning of the original text.162 These closer
questions depend on some notion of what meaning to ascribe to the
text of the existing regulation. If courts leave that task largely to the
agency, then far more will pass muster as simply a clarifying interpre-
tation than as an amendment or rescission for which the agency
should have used additional procedures. 163
One recent procedural challenge to an interpretive rule provides
159. See, e.g., State of Indiana v. Sullivan, 934 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The APA
confers no right to comment on an interpretive rule which merely restates an obligation
imposed by properly promulgated federal regulations."); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 1037,1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). See generally Elizabeth Williams, Annota-
tion, What Constitutes "Interpretative Rule" of Agency So As to Exempt Such Action from
Notice Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act, 126 A.L.R. Fed. 347 (1995).
160. See American Mining Congress v. MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106, 1109, 1110 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
161. See id. at 1112 ("A rule does not, in this inquiry, become an amendment merely
because it supplies crisper and more detailed lines than the authority being interpreted.");
see also Interport Inc. v. Magaw, 135 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (sustaining interpretive
rule as a gloss on an existing regulation); In re Offshore Management Corp., 111 F.3d 443,
453 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Clarry v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996)
(same).
162. See American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1110-12 (explaining that an interpre-
tive rule cannot go beyond the existing regulation); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636
F.2d 464,469 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (distinguishing supplementation from construction); see also
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,586-88 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hoc-
tor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 169-71 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an agency could not "inter-
pret" a regulation to supply non-existent language); Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Med. Ctr.,
50 F.3d 522, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (invalidating on procedural grounds an interpretive rule used to specify
an open-ended provision in a legislative rule); supra note 80 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the suggestion that courts should distinguish between "explanation" and "embel-
lishment" when consulting legislative history materials).
163. See Asimow, supra note 3, at 396 ("[When] the second rule is consistent with the
earlier one.., there is no principled way to determine whether it amends the prior rule or
merely explains, clarifies, or interprets it, and courts by necessity usually defer to an
agency's characterization of its intent." (footnotes omitted)).
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striking confirmation of this problem. The Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) had issued a series of three "Program Policy
Letters" over the course of one year, each superseding its predeces-
sor, in order to define the term "diagnosed" in an existing regulation
to include chest x-rays scored as having a certain degree of darkening
of the lungs. In deciding that the agency's latest interpretation did
not amount to an amendment of the rule, and therefore did not need
to satisfy notice-and-comment requirements, the court consulted
relevant definitions appearing in medical dictionaries and guidelines
(only one of which pre-dated the fifteen year old rule) and in regula-
tions issued by unrelated federal agencies. 164 This approach closely
resembles textualism's emphasis on dictionaries and surrounding con-
text or structure to assist in the search for meaning. The court made
no apparent effort to discern MSHA's original intent, though it had
cited the Federal Register notices for the proposed and final rule in
the background section of the opinion. 65 Perhaps none of the parties
drew the court's attention to the regulation's administrative history,
even though the language in the preamble to the final rule seemed to
support the petitioner's argument that a chest x-ray read by techni-
cians did not, without more, amount to a diagnosis of lung disease as
originally understood by the agency. 66
Putting aside the inevitable turnover in the upper echelons of an
agency, whether prompted by changes in the administration or simply
the passage of time, rulemaking requires the collaborative but epi-
sodic attention of numerous agency officials, 67 so much so that an
easily cured flaw identified by a judicial remand just a few years after
promulgation may derail an initiative entirely. 68 To think that high-
164. See American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112-13.
165. See id. at 1107. Ironically, the court relied on what it characterized as the "legisla-
tive history" of the APA, though the source it quoted from was published after enactment
by an agency involved in the drafting of that statute. See id. at 1109 (twice quoting from
the Attorney General's Manual on the APA); see also infra note 201 (explaining the Su-
preme Court's longstanding acceptance of the Attorney General's Manual as a source of
legislative history for the APA).
166. See 42 Fed. Reg. 65,534, 65,535 (1977) (describing the obligations under the new
legislative rule as "reporting the fact that a doctor has diagnosed an illness"); see also Lars
Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241,
259 (1999) ("Federal agencies make numerous decisions that depend on how one defines
disease."). If in fact the petitioners neglected to quote this snippet (putting aside its ad-
mittedly minimal illumination of agency intent), this may simply reflect their recognition
of the strong tradition of judicial deference to post-promulgation interpretations by agen-
cies and the infrequent citation of language in preambles.
167. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory
Agency Rulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 19,20-22.
168. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 258, 295 (1987) (Courts "imagine that remands
for further consideration or explanation have a modest effect on an agency's regulatory
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level agency officials will either know or care what their predecessors
had in mind many years earlier seems naive; instead, agencies will se-
lect the interpretation best suited to the exigencies of the present
day.169 Just as members of Congress may attempt to manufacture
legislative intent, sometimes years after the passage of a bill, rather
than go to the trouble of attempting to amend it, agencies may offer
contrived reinterpretations of old regulations rather than undertaking
the notice-and-comment procedures necessary for adopting a genuine
amendment.
(3) Interpreting Regulations During Litigation
One critical difference exists between the interpretation of stat-
utes and regulations by the courts. When the meaning of a statute
comes into question during litigation, the author of the text is rarely if
ever before the court. Although Congress occasionally participates
by filing an amicus brief when someone challenges recent legisla-
tion,170 the Department of Justice (DOJ) generally represents the
policy choice .... But this view enormously underestimates the potential impact of a judi-
cial remand .... "). As these commentators elaborated:
Any remand occurs long after the rulemaking docket has been closed
and the staff has been reassigned. Often the remand finds the agency
with a new administrator and a new agenda. The idea that an agency
can or will quickly turn to remedying the factual or analytic defects in
its remanded rule is surely naive, however minor those problems might
appear in the abstract.
Id.; see also American Med. Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remand-
ing without vacating a rule so as to minimize the "obvious hardship" to the agency of cur-
ing its procedural error).
169. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 104, 106 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting apparent selectivity in interpretation); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,
156 (1991) (recognizing that reviewing courts must "protect regulated parties from biased"
and "overzealous interpretations" of an agency's rules); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 16 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("A
certain danger lurks in the ability of an agency to perfunctorily mold its regulations to con-
form to its instant needs.").
170. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988); see also Charles Tiefer, The
Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional
Congressional Client, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 47, 54-55 (discussing
congressional defense of statutes). Occasionally, Congress will intervene to support old
legislation whose constitutionality the DOJ would not defend. See Adolph Coors Co. v.
Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Department of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 772, 779 (1999) (resolving challenges to
Census Bureau interpretation of an old statute brought by private individuals as well as
the House of Representatives); Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case That Tests
Miranda Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al (explaining that the DOJ has refused
to defend the constitutionality of an old federal statute designed to override the Court's
Miranda decision). Challenges to newly enacted statutes may emanate from members
who voted against passage. On the standing of legislators to file such challenges, see
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United States in litigation.171 Thus, a court will not have the benefit
of the views of the institutional author (or, more typically, the
author's successor) about the meaning of the statutory text in ques-
tion.
In contrast, when questions about the meaning of agency regula-
tions arise during litigation, the institutional author (or successor)
frequently will be a party to the suit and available to assist judges
when grappling with ambiguities. Indeed, unlike legislators who have
no legitimate role in the execution of the laws that they write,172 agen-
cies must implement the laws that they adopt, and oftentimes judicial
review of a regulation will involve the authoring agency directly,
whether in defending against a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule or
in the course of attempting to enforce the rule against a party.173 This
difference also suggests, however, that courts need to guard against
self-serving agency interpretations. Whatever congruence may have
existed between an agency's original intent and a contemporaneous
interpretation announced shortly after promulgation, the passage of
time will lead to a divergence between the agency's likely original un-
derstanding and its current considered view of the rule. In other con-
texts, ambiguities in a text are construed against the drafter for pre-
cisely this reason. 74 Although courts generally will not credit agency
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820-30 (1997). In some instances, the executive branch de-
cides to mount a judicial challenge to a statute. See Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bow-
man, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of
Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1979); Note, Executive Discretion and the Congres-
sional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 970 n.1 (1983).
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994); see also Case, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1004, 1011
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (recognizing "that the statutory scheme grant[s] the Department of Jus-
tice exclusive and plenary power to supervise and conduct all litigation to which the
United States is a party"); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1973) (concluding that this provision denies a congres-
sional "litigant the right to sue as the United States").
172. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275 (1991) ("Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to
its own agents or to its own Members." (footnote omitted)); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 726 (1986) ("The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does
not possess.").
173. See supra Part II.A & B. In rare cases, such questions also may arise in tort litiga-
tion brought against an agency. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 545 (1988)
("The parties.., have given us no indication of the way in which the [agency] interprets
and applies the regulations setting forth the criteria for compliance. Given that these
regulations are particularly abstruse, we hesitate to decide the question on the scanty rec-
ord before us.").
174. See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 556 (1956) (construing ambiguities in an execu-
tive order against the government); Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or
Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Prece-
dents and Authorities, 16 CARDOzo L. REv. 1879,1977 (1995) (1837) ("[I]f a word, or sen-
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interpretations of regulations advanced for the first time by appellate
counsel,175 the Supreme Court has accepted interpretations that an
agency first expresses during administrative adjudication that then
finds its way into the courts.176
Issues of regulatory meaning do not, however, arise only in litiga-
tion involving the authoring agency. In some instances, challenges to
agency action may turn on the interpretation of regulations issued by
another agency,177 or these questions will arise in the context of a citi-
zen suit to enforce regulatory requirements. 178 In addition, challenges
brought by the beneficiaries of federal programs administered by
state and local agencies may require an interpretation of regulations
promulgated by the federal agency charged with supervising the pro-
gram but not named as a party to the lawsuit. 179
tence of a contract, leaves a decided doubt, sound sense dictates that they are to be taken
most strongly against the party using it ...."); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule
and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171, 173-86 & nn.2-3, 215 n.112 (1995) (summarizing but criticiz-
ing this common law rule as applied to the interpretation of insurance and other types of
contracts).
175. See United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) ("No
deference is owed when an agency has not formulated an official interpretation of its
regulation, but is merely advancing a litigation position."); see also Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) ("We have never [deferred] to agency litigating
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative prac-
tie.... Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient liti-
gating position would be entirely inappropriate.").
176. See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,157 (1991) ("The Secretary's interpretation of
the OSH Act regulations in an administrative adjudication, however, is agency action, not
a post hoc rationalization of it."); id. at 158 ("[T]he Secretary's interpretation is not unde-
serving of deference merely because the Secretary advances it for the first time in an ad-
ministrative adjudication."); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,462 (1997) ("Petition-
ers complain that the Secretary's interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief;
but that does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference.");
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429-30 & n.16 (1988) (deferring even though "the
Secretary had not taken a position on this question until this litigation"); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The mere fact that an agency
offers its interpretation in the course of litigation does not automatically preclude defer-
ence to the agency."); Bradberry v. Director, OWCP, 117 F.3d 1361,1366 (11th Cir. 1997).
177. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697-98 (1991); Novicki v.
Cook, 946 F.2d 938, 94041 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory
Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35,73 (1991).
178. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d
1239,1247-48 (3d Cir. 1995).
179. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 276 & 279 n.33 (1969); Clarke v.
Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1996); Ritter v. Cecil County Office of Housing &
Community Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 327-30 (4th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehab.
Servs., 689 F.2d 724,728-29 (7th Cir. 1982); cf. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Fed-
eralism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1999) (arguing for
similar reasons that state agencies should receive Chevron deference when they must im-
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In other cases, purely private disputes will raise such interpretive
questions.180 For example, in tort litigation, the violation of a relevant
federal safety regulation may give the plaintiff the benefit of a negli-
gence per se instruction, 181 and agencies sometimes file amicus briefs
to offer their assistance to the courts in such cases.'82 In addition,
commercial litigation may turn on the meaning of ambiguous federal
regulations, 83 and again agencies sometimes file amicus briefs in such
cases. 84 Finally, private litigation may involve the assertion of statu-
tory rights that Congress decided to entrust to a federal agency for
plement federal statutes).
180. See Jacob H. Beuscher, Public Representation in Private Litigation Involving Ad-
ministrative Rules, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 355, 357-65 (describing numerous contexts in which
questions about the proper construction of a regulation will arise in litigation not involving
the agency). Agency interpretive rules also may become relevant in private litigation that
turns on the meaning of ambiguous statutory language. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,138-40 (1944).
181. See Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1994);
Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 558-65 (3d Cir. 1983); Lars Noah, Re-
conceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards Defense,
37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 903, 952-56 (1996) (discussing negligence per se claims premised
on alleged non-compliance with federal safety standards, and noting the potential for diffi-
culties in determining non-compliance in the absence of a formal agency finding to that
effect). On much rarer occasions, compliance with such requirements may provide the
alleged tortfeasor with the benefit of a government standards defense. See Lars Noah,
Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2000).
182. See, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 401 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995);
Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 7,9-10 (1997); see also National Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740,747 & n.9
(9th Cir. 1994) (crediting USDA amicus brief as an interpretation of labeling regulations
in the course of declaring a state statute preempted). Such submissions may, however,
seek to contradict the plain meaning of the agency's regulation. See Lars Noah, Amplifi-
cation of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 187-88
(1994). Courts will not necessarily credit such interpretations. See United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 n.25 (1975); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,589 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf. American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that it would not necessarily
defer to an agency's interpretation expressed by one of its lawyers in an amicus brief be-
cause this did not represent an official position and was offered during a remand pro-
ceeding in which the agency had no stake).
183. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 344-
52 (1982) (struggling to interpret the effect of an ICC regulation in a private dispute over
the obligation to pay freight charges); Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.,
902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to decide, in private litigation under the Lan-
ham Act, how the FDA might interpret its ambiguous drug labeling regulations); Cooper
Dev. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 762 F. Supp. 1145, 1151-55 (D.N.i. 1991).
184. See, e.g., Florida Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 174 F.3d 1227, 1231-34
(11th Cir. 1999); Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 858-60 (4th Cir.
1997).
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further elaboration. 185
Four decisions issued during the final week of the Supreme
Court's latest Term amply illustrate this situation. All of the cases in-
volved claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA):186 one lawsuit against a state agency that turned in part on
the meaning of the DOJ's implementing regulations,187 and the others
against private employers that turned in part on the meaning of rules
issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
coupled with the Department of Transportation's rules governing cer-
tain job qualifications. 88 In each case, the Court emphasized that
none of the parties had questioned the validity of these regulations
but only disagreed about their reading. In all such instances, judges
must decipher the meaning of legislative rules without the benefit of
the agency's direct guidance, a posture akin to disputes about statu-
tory meaning that arise in all sorts of litigation that Congress can only
watch from the sidelines. Whether or not regulatory officials go to
the trouble of filing an amicus brief in such cases, private attorneys
and the courts would do well to consult published pre-enactment ex-
pressions of agency intent.
(4) Interpreting Regulations in Other Contexts
Whatever courts might do with such extrinsic materials, attorneys
who provide regulatory advice to clients routinely consult pre- (and
185. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,461-62 (1997) (explaining that the Secretary of
Labor had filed an amicus brief at the Court's request, in a suit by police officers seeking
overtime pay from a city, to help clarify the meaning of a regulation implementing the
FLSA); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 211-17, 222 (1981) (relying on
weak post-promulgation materials to interpret truth-in-lending rule); id. at 224-29 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the plain meaning of that rule);
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 582-83, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting that the DOJ filed an amicus brief to cast light on its interpretation of ambiguities
in a rule that it had issued under the ADA); id. at 585 n.5 (rejecting the suggestion that the
rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of its rule did not apply in the context of
private litigation).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
187. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2188-90 (1999) (plurality opinion) (remand-
ing an ADA challenge brought by mentally retarded patients against state officials for
failing to deinstitutionalize them).
188. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2167-74 (1999) (rejecting a
visually-impaired employee's ADA claim); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2133, 2136-39 (1999) (rejecting a hypertensive employee's ADA claim); see also Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144-46, 2150-51 (1999) (rejecting visually-
impaired employees' ADA claims based in part on guidelines issued by the EEOC and the
DOJ interpreting the statute). In Albertsons, even though the DOJ filed an amicus brief,
the Court cited numerous Federal Register notices in the course of trying to understand the
intended operation of the Department of Transportation's waiver rule. See 119 S. Ct. at
2170-74.
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post-) promulgation agency pronouncements when attempting to con-
strue the meaning of administrative rules. For example, in tax plan-
ning, one often relies on what amounts to a regulatory history of IRS
rules, much as one depends on committee reports and explanations
for understanding amendments to the Code.189 Materials reflecting
post-promulgation interpretations are, however, more varied and of-
ten less readily available to members of the public and regulated in-
dustry than pre-promulgation sources,190 and, of course, they lack the
relative permanence of a codified regulation and the published ex-
planatory materials that accompany it. As a result, final preambles
provide a common source for attorneys to consult when offering
opinions about a regulated entity's rights and obligations.
When problems of inadequate notice arise during administrative
enforcement proceedings, reviewing courts may defer to the agency's
unanticipated reinterpretation but soften its impact on the party en-
snared by that interpretation. 191 Other courts will reject such inter-
189. See Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities": Determining Valid Legal
Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding
Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1086-109, 1130-33 (1988) (discussing a hierarchy of 29 categories
of administrative authority that may be relevant to tax planning, though noting that pre-
ambles have only limited value); see also Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue
Rulings: Reconciling Diverging Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1041-48 (1995) (distin-
guishing between Treasury regulations, interpretive rules, revenue rulings, and letter rul-
ings).
190. See 61 Fed. Reg. 9181, 9182 (1996) (documenting the proliferation of such informal
communications at the FDA: "Well over a thousand such [guidance] documents exist.");
American Mining Congress v. MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing a
series of three "Program Policy Letters" issued in less than one year-each superseding
the previous one and none of them published in the Federal Register-to define a term ap-
pearing in the agency's 15 year old regulation). Even if made available to most of the di-
rectly interested parties, persons subject to (or benefitting from) the regulation will have
no simple way of determining whether they have before them the latest interpretation, in
contrast to the greater ease of checking the currency of a regulation appearing in the
C.F.R. and tracing its preamble.
191. See United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d 216,221-23,225-30 (4th Cir.
1997) (deferring to the agency's interpretation, but sustaining only those sanctions im-
posed for conduct occurring after a company received actual notice of the agency's inter-
pretation where nothing in the rulemaking record had hinted at such an interpretation of
the rule); Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996); General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d
1324, 1328-34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting the imposition of liability, finding that the regula-
tions and post-promulgation letters provided inadequate notice); id. at 1330 ("[T]he inter-
pretation is so far from a reasonable person's understanding of the regulations that they
could not have fairly informed GE of the agency's perspective."); Rollins Envtl. Servs.
(N.J.) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (mitigating civil penalties: "EPA's
misleading imprecision, not Rollins' lack of acuity, led the company astray. No reasonable
reader of this provision could have known that EPA's current construction is what the
agency originally must have had in mind."); Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3-4
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing denial of license application: "The agency's interpretation is
entitled to deference, but if it wishes to use that interpretation to cut off a party's right, it
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pretations altogether and instead urge the agency to use its power to
amend the regulation, on the theory that the inability of regulated
parties to anticipate the agency's construction demonstrates its unrea-
sonableness.192 Thus, concerns about fair notice to regulated entities
of their legal obligations explain why the effort to divine regulatory
intent has such practical importance outside of the private litigation
context when agencies directly apply their rules. Although courts ul-
timately may review enforcement decisions, agencies resolve the bulk
of such disputes internally without any judicial scrutiny.
Lawyers who represent clients before agencies frequently utilize
pre-enactment materials in presenting arguments to agency officials,
whether in adjudicatory or rulemaking settings. I can still recall as an
associate poring over old preambles in search of interpretive clues
that would add further authoritative weight to rulemaking comments
or licensing submissions to agencies on behalf of our clients. The
agency officials with whom we dealt appeared to feel somewhat con-
strained by their predecessors' expressions of intent, but I would hate
to think that this endeavor was largely pointless as a theoretical mat-
ter.
In short, private parties inevitably consider explanatory materials
that accompany a rule whenever the text fails to provide a clear an-
swer to a particular question. Courts should endorse rather than un-
dermine the reliability of these materials when questions later arise
about the meaning of a regulation. Otherwise, agencies will get the
message-if they have not gotten it already-that their original intent
means nothing after all and act accordingly, 9 3 leaving regulated enti-
must give full notice of its interpretation."); Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (same); see also Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d
1318, 1325 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that a person "proceeding in good faith should not be
subjected to a trap brought about by an interpretation of a regulation hidden in the bosom
of the agency"); Kenneth K. Kilbert & Christian J. Helbling, Interpreting Regulations in
Environmental Enforcement Cases: Where Agency Deference and Fair Notice Collide, 17
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 449,472 (1998) (explaining that final preambles should provide adequate
notice to regulated entities of a particular agency interpretation of an ambiguous rule).
192. See, e.g., Georgia Pac. Corp. v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999, 1004-06 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam); Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976). This bor-
rows from the canon of construction favoring lenity. See M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 327 U.S. 614, 621-26 (1946) (plurality opinion) (applying canon of strict construc-
tion to a rule carrying criminal penalties); id. at 622 ("Not even the Administrator's inter-
pretations of his own regulations can cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to
otherwise vague language."); Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability,
58 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1, 14-25 (1996) (discussing the rule of lenity as applied in cases of
statutory construction).
193. A similar phenomenon has emerged in the wake of Chevron's strong rule of defer-
ence to agencies on statutory interpretation, with at least a few regulatory officials busy
cloaking themselves in that safe haven from the outset of a rulemaking or other proceed-
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ties guessing about the precise nature of their legal rights and obliga-
tions.
D. Constructing a Regulatory History
Because of the strong tradition of deference to post-
promulgation agency interpretations, courts rarely look to pre-
promulgation materials when questions about the meaning of am-
biguous regulations arise, even though they could benefit from doing
so in a variety of contexts. Moreover, when they do inquire about the
agency's original intent, courts usually refer only to the preamble ac-
companying the final rule, which represents the best but hardly only
useful source of guidance. This phenomenon is doubling surprising,
given the judiciary's continuing readiness to look to legislative histo-
ries and the far greater reliability of regulatory histories as guides to
an agency's original intent. This section will suggest that courts
should reconsider their prevailing approach and make greater use of a
wide range of pre-promulgation sources.
Aside from focusing on the text and context of ambiguous lan-
guage in a legislative rule, or more frequently deflecting the task alto-
gether by simply deferring to an agency's post-promulgation interpre-
tation, courts could consider a variety of materials as providing
evidence of an agency's original intent in promulgating a regulation.
"The informal rulemaking process ... often will result in the creation
of a legislative history more useful and reliable than that of a stat-
ute.' 94 Possible materials include the preamble accompanying the
ing, instead of attempting to offer persuasive explanations defending the reasonableness of
their preferred interpretations and then only later, in defending against a judicial chal-
lenge, invoking Chevron as a kicker. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,121, 35,124 (1998)
(FHFB); 61 Fed. Reg. 51,599, 51,603-04 (1996) (EPA); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,402, 44,415
n.31, 45,221, 45,252 (1996) (FDA); see also Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation
to Improve the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. &
POL. 105, 128 (1997) ("[C]ourts have reviewed agencies' ultimate interpretations of stat-
utes to determine whether they are within the 'zone of indeterminacy,' but have not ex-
amined the interpretive methodologies that form the basis of those decisions."); Mark Sei-
denfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 109-11 & n.157 (1994) (criticizing
the agency's failure to justify a revised statutory interpretation designed to support the
abortion gag rule).
194. Weaver, supra note 7, at 711. As Professor Weaver elaborated:
Courts must treat regulations differently than statutes because agen-
cies generate different types of interpretive materials than do legisla-
tures. Instead of committee reports, explanations of committee chair-
men, records of debate and the other materials that legislatures
typically create, agencies prepare notices of proposed rulemakings,
draft rules, regulatory analyses and other documents. Courts have not
thoroughly considered which of these materials should be used for in-
terpretive purposes ....
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final rule, regulatory analyses of various sorts prepared in tandem
with promulgation of the final rule, notices of proposed rulemaking
and similar published documents, internal agency memoranda, and
even the recollections of persons involved in the formulation of the
rule. This hierarchy superficially resembles the sorts of materials
utilized in preparing a legislative history of a statute, but, when courts
bother to inquire about original agency intent, they have approached
these sources of regulatory history differently, in part because the
correspondence to pre-enactment legislative materials is inexact. In
fact, administrative rulemaking may have more in common with the
work performed by congressional committees than by the full legisla-
ture when considering a bill,195 though the pedigree of the materials
generated by agencies during this process generally is a good deal less
suspect than committee reports.
(1) Final Preambles
The preamble that accompanies a final rule when it is published
in the Federal Register represents the most obvious source of guid-
ance, and courts occasionally do look to preambles for clues about an
agency's original intent.196 As Justice Thurgood Marshall explained
in a dissenting opinion, the preamble to a final rule provides "strong
Id. at 683 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 711-17 (suggesting that courts look to NPRMs
and preambles to final rules or other official statements issued during the rulemaking pro-
cess but not unofficial views expressed by agency employees).
195. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 753 (observing that the APA's basic rulemaking pro-
cedures "fairly suggested the parameters of a hearing on legislation, conducted by a legis-
lative committee"); see also Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[N]otice
and comment rulemaking... is analogous to the procedure employed by legislatures in
making statutes. The notice of proposed rulemaking corresponds to the bill and the recep-
tion of written comments to the hearing on the bill."); United States v. Frontier Airlines,
Inc., 563 F.2d 1008, 1013 (10th Cir. 1977) ("The [agency preamble] is a summary of what,
in the legislative process, would be gleaned from the hearings and the statements of posi-
tion which make up the legislative history. The Basis and Purpose Statement is a very sig-
nificant portion of a regulation when an issue arises as to its application and scope.").
196. See, e.g., Empire Co. v. OSHRC, 136 F.3d 873, 877-78 (1st Cir. 1998); Ramey v.
Gober, 120 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (calling statements in a preamble "powerful
extrinsic evidence"); Clarke v. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 1996); Martin v.
American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 145-46 (6th Cir. 1993); Martin v. OSHRC, 941 F.2d
1051, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1991); Vermont v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1988);
McLaughlin v. ASARCO, Inc., 841 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988); Wiggins Bros., Inc. v.
Department of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting the argu-
ment that only the regulatory materials codified in the C.F.R. may be considered, drawing
analogies to other forms of legislative history: "In the construction of the Constitution of
the United States, statutes and regulations, the federal rule permits and requires consid-
eration of preambles in appropriate cases."); UPG, Inc. v. Edwards, 647 F.2d 147, 152
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) ("In considering the question of plain meaning, the pream-
ble to the regulation in question must not be disregarded.").
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evidence of regulatory intent. ' 197 In the past few years, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has more clearly en-
dorsed (though only in dicta) reference to such preambles for inter-
pretive guidance. In 1997, the court allowed that "contemporary in-
dications as to what the agency meant by the language used, such as
the comments received, could play the same role as legislative history
does in both steps of a Chevron analysis."' 98 In 1999, the court added
that "we have often recognized that the preamble to a regulation is
evidence of an agency's contemporaneous understanding of its pro-
posed rules.... Although the preamble does not 'control' the mean-
ing of the regulation, it may serve as a source of evidence concerning
contemporaneous agency intent."' 99
The D.C. Circuit may have exaggerated the frequency of its use
of preambles for this purpose, but the approach makes perfect sense.
After all, the APA requires that agencies "incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
2°°
197. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 165 (1987) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Only rarely, however, has the Supreme Court referred to preambles when inter-
preting agency regulations, and then only in passing. See, e.g., INS v. National Ctr. for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 190 & n.4 (1991) (citing, among other things, the
response to public comments published in the agency's preamble); United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129-30 & n.7 (1985) (quoting from the preamble,
though simply to underscore the Court's conclusion about the plain meaning of the regula-
tion); see also supra note 142 (preemption cases). In one recent decision that was not
framed as involving deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation,
the Court quoted at length from the preamble to support the application of an SEC rule in
a misappropriation prosecution. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 674 (1997);
cf. id. at 698 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the major-
ity's selective quotation from this preamble).
198. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
see also id. at 586-87 (quoting from the preambles accompanying the proposed and final
rule issued by another agency whose guidelines the DOJ adopted but without reiterating
the same relevant points in its own preamble).
199. Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (concluding, however, that "[t]he preamble language at issue here is as ambigu-
ous as the regulatory text"); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. DOT, 105 F.3d 702, 708
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (accepting an agency's narrow interpretation, based on language in the
preamble, to resolve a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to a regulation); Booker
v. Edwards, 99 F.3d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sustaining an agency interpretation of a
regulation based on consistency with statements in its preamble); National Family Plan-
ning & Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(quoting at length from a preamble in the course of deciding that a subsequent interpreta-
tion of the rule amounted to an impermissible amendment).
200. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 25
(1946) (explaining that the concise statement "should not only relate to the data so pre-
sented but with reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule");
Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313, 315, 325-31 (1996) (arguing that courts should re-
quire that agencies explain the basis for their legal conclusions); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
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According to a widely-accepted contemporaneous interpretation of
the Act, this provision was "important in that the courts and the pub-
lic may be expected to use such statements in the interpretation of the
agency's rules. '20 ' Thus, Congress evidently viewed the concise
statement less as a basis for undertaking judicial review of legislative
rules than as a method for providing some further elaboration about
their meaning. Moreover, some agencies subsequently adopted
regulations promising to adhere to statements of policy appearing in
such preambles, thereby further confirming the reliability of such ex-
planations.202
Until thirty years ago, preambles generally contained little of
substance, providing only a conclusory statement that the agency had
considered all public comments received and decided to promulgate
the accompanying rule. As courts became more demanding in their
substantive review of rules adopted through notice-and-comment
procedures, 20 3 however, agency prolixity increased.2°4 Preambles for
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547 (1992)
(emphasizing the importance of this agency obligation to explain decisions).
201. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr
32 (1947). The courts have treated this document as authoritative guidance on the APA.
See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (calling it "the Government's own most authoritative interpretation of the APA...
which we have repeatedly given great weight"); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,546 (1978) (noting that it represents "a contemporaneous interpreta-
tion previously given some deference by this Court because of the role played by the De-
partment of Justice in drafting the legislation"). But cf John F. Duffy, Administrative
Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REv. 113, 131-34 (1998) (criticizing this as a
source of relevant legislative history because it was prepared post-enactment by an agency
with a direct stake in the issues). This interpretation seems consistent with the judicial re-
view provision of the APA, which provides that "the reviewing court shall... determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It,
10 ADMIN. L.. 1, 9-10 (1996) (making this point).
202. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1) (1999); cf Lars Noah, The FDA's New Policy on
Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113 (1997) (criti-
cizing the proposed revocation of this rule).
203. Courts insisted on increasingly formal administrative records to facilitate judicial
review. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,249-53 (2d
Cir. 1977); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1306-09 (1986) (de-
scribing this development). At the same time, courts began to engage in a fairly searching
review of these records and the substantive merits of agency decisions, asking whether
regulatory officials had taken a "hard look" at all of the issues and data. See, e.g., Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 46-57 (1983); National Lime Ass'n v.
EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 & n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 35-36
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc); National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491
January 2000] DIVINING REGULATORY INTENT
especially controversial rules may respond in detail to public com-
ments in anticipation of defending against a judicial challenge. Al-
though an extreme example, the text of the FDA's 1996 tobacco
product marketing regulations occupied only three pages, but the ac-
companying preamble and appended jurisdictional statement ran al-
most 1000 pages in the Federal Register.20 5
As preambles become more detailed and self-consciously drafted
in anticipation of substantive challenges, the opportunities for misun-
derstanding an agency's intent based on some language extracted
from this wealth of materials may increase.206 Nonetheless, agencies
F.2d 31, 35-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Adminis-
trative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 238-40 (1984) (discussing the emergence of hard
look review).
204. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Proc-
ess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) ("Agency explanations for rules are far more lengthy
and intricate than they were in the 1960s and early 1970s."). More typically, agencies will
avoid the hassles of engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking whenever possible. See
Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification. Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Ju-
dicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REv. 483 (1997); Paul R.
Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 453 (1995).
This may help explain agencies' preference for amending old rules through reinterpreta-
tion. If courts took original intent more seriously and stopped condoning amendatory in-
terpretations, agencies may have still another reason to avoid rulemaking in the first place,
but this seems unlikely. Instead, agencies may adapt rules to changing circumstances more
slowly, which could exacerbate the problem of regulatory obsolescence. Cf. Pettibone
Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 536, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the IRS's claim that it
could update an obsolete regulation by reinterpreting it); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing
Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
1187, 1251 (1997) ("[I]f forced to comply with preexisting rules, agencies, as a theoretical
matter, may be unable to apply new policies to current disputes. Agencies may lose the
flexibility to change policy when contemporary technological or financial realities so dic-
tate.").
205. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996). For a somewhat more typical example involving a sig-
nificant rule, see 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (announcing the EPA's revised ozone emis-
sion standards, whose text occupied two pages but were accompanied by a preamble that
ran almost 40 pages). Notwithstanding their lengthy explanatory materials, courts recently
invalidated both of these controversial and time-consuming initiatives. See American
Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating the EPA's ozone
standard), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (Jan. 27, 2000) (Nos. 99-1257 & 99-
1263); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998) (invali-
dating the FDA's tobacco rule), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (Apr. 26, 1999) (No. 98-
1152). A similar fate befell a consolidated OSHA rulemaking, see AFL-CIO v. OSHA,
965 F.2d 962, 986-87 (11th Cir. 1992), notwithstanding an almost 500 page preamble, see 54
Fed. Reg. 2332 (1989).
206. See, e.g., Seneca Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384, 1398 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that the arguments of the regulated parties gave "undue
predominance and effect to minor disconnected and imprecise language of the preamble,
selected out of context"); see also Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial
Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1311 & n.367 (1999) (arguing that agencies
craft their preambles with a view toward litigation); Manning, supra note 7, at 690 (noting
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may provide precise guidance in preambles that courts should not
later allow officials to ignore. For instance, a preamble may have in-
cluded reassurances in response to comments that expressed concerns
about particular applications of a proposed rule, and the agency
should not subsequently interpret the rule otherwise.207
One must not confuse regulatory preambles with statutory pre-
ambles. On occasion, Congress will include a series of findings or
purposes in a bill,208 and these statements will have run the gauntlet of
bicameralism and presentment along with the rest of the text of the
statute, though ironically the Supreme Court rarely cites these sec-
tions when looking for expressions of intent.209 Preambles that ac-
company a final rule will not themselves have undergone notice-and-
comment procedures,210 though they have emerged from such proce-
that the anticipation of searching judicial review in the event of a substantive challenge to
a rule "may well distract agencies from using the statement of basis and purpose as a de-
vice for coherent explanation of regulatory meaning"). Conversely, if courts gave undue
attention to preambles when construing ambiguous rules, agencies may do what legislators
have done with the Congressional Record-namely, spice these up with misleading expres-
sions of intent. Cf. id. at 690 n.372 ("Overreliance [by reviewing courts on preambles for
interpretive guidance] could distort the rulemaking process by tempting agencies to slip
desired points into their statements of basis and purpose rather than including them in the
text of a regulation.").
207. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music, 193 F.3d 730, 737 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)
("When the 'legislative history' of an administrative regulation evinces an intent not to
cover a certain subject matter, the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA cannot
be evaded merely by interpreting an existing regulation to cover subject matter con-
sciously omitted from its scope." (quoting the lower court's opinion with approval)).
208. See, e.g., Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
417, § 2, 108 Stat. 4325, 4325-26 (enumerating more than a dozen findings); Consumer
Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 2, 86 Stat. 1207, 1207-08 (1972) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 2051 (1994)); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922, 922-23; see also Spence, supra note 60, at 600 n.76 (noting that almost 10% of the
statutes enacted by the 102d Congress included "policy" or "purpose" sections); id. at 617
(urging Congress more frequently to include such findings, or statements of policy and in-
tent, in the text of statutes as a response to the judiciary's increased textualism).
209. See Schacter, supra note 27, at 26-27. For one such example, see Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997). Even more recently, the Court relied on such a finding to infer
an intent for a more limited coverage of a statute than claimed by the litigants. See Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147-49 (1999) (emphasizing that, because the
ADA included a finding that 43 million Americans had disabilities, Congress could not
have intended to include persons with easily corrected infirmities such as near-sightedness
because that group exceeds 160 million Americans); cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 & n.14 (1981) (holding that a statutory preamble simply offered
findings but did not create any substantive rights); Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d
868, 885 (4th Cir. 1984) (same).
210. The only exception is the occasional codification of a short introduction with the
text of the regulation. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 711-12 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting an introductory section to help interpret the meaning of a
set of rules); Industrial Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1312 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (dis-
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dures, 211 and one could argue that they simply represent a "logical
outgrowth" of the proposal, which would obviate the need for further
notice-and-comment procedures.212 The occasional congressional
practice of ratifying a legislative history at the time of enactment
might provide a better analogy to the preambles that accompany a
regulation.2 13
A similar parallel might be drawn to the advisory committee
notes that accompany the various rules of procedure formulated by
the federal courts 214 Although some commentators have complained
about the Supreme Court's recent turn to textualism when interpret-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence or of Civil Procedure,215 judges
routinely consult these explanatory materials. The federal rules of
tinguishing a codified "purpose" section from the "preamble" published in the Federal
Register). Such statements by agencies would more clearly resemble statutory preambles
and findings.
211. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284, 291 (1st Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing that an interpretation expressed in a preamble "was developed through a
lengthy notice and comment period, with substantial public participation"); see also Fer-
tilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that an interpretation
of a statutory term in the preamble does not itself require informal rulemaking); cf. Rob-
ert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 55-63 (1990) (arguing that Chevron deference should not extend to
agency interpretations of statutes if expressed through interpretive rules and other less
formal formats not subject to notice-and-comment procedures).
212 See Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. FAA, 169 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
McLaughlin v. ASARCO, Inc., 841 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1988); Phillip M. Kannan,
The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1996).
213. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075; see also Spence, supra note 60, at 616 (suggesting that "Congress should explicitly
affirm that legislative history is an integral part of the enacting process"); supra note 51
(mentioning similar interpretive directives from the legislature).
214. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1029, at 124 (2d ed. 1987) ("In interpreting the rules, the Advisory
Committee Notes are a very important source of information and should be given consid-
erable weight. Although these Notes are not conclusive, they provide something akin to a
'legislative history' of the rules .... (footnotes omitted)); see also Mississippi Publ'g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946) ("[I]n ascertaining [the Rules'] meaning the
construction given to them by the [Advisory] Committee is of weight.").
215. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745, 783-86 (1990) (criticizing the Court's plain mean-
ing approach as interfering with the dynamic, common law method best suited for inter-
preting the rules); Moore, supra note 9, at 1076-97, 1107-09 (objecting to the plain mean-
ing approach, which simply may reflect the Supreme Court's own unease about
formulating rules in the first place, and advocating a purposive or dynamic approach be-
cause these rules differ from statutes and because the advisory committee notes provide
only a weak form of legislative history as they do not necessarily reflect what the Court
itself had intended). This argument could also be understood as urging the acceptance of
post-promulgation interpretive materials that the Court generates by virtue of its dual role
as rule-maker and rule-interpreter. See id. at 1094-96.
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procedure represent an unusual hybrid between legislative rules
promulgated by agencies and regular congressional statutes,216 and
the Court occasionally uses a strict plain meaning standard,217 but its
more typical approach even today relies heavily on commentary from
the advisory committee notes. 218 This greater attention to pre-
promulgation materials may reflect two distinctive characteristics of
the rules of procedure: first, the advisory committee notes are trans-
mitted to Congress in tandem with the text of the rules in the same
way that committee reports accompany a bill to the floor; and, sec-
ond, the Court itself would have to generate any post-promulgation
interpretations,21 9 which is essentially what it does at the time that it
interprets a rule in litigation, but such precedent would not yet exist
in a case of first impression where the Court must resolve an ambigu-
ity. When construing agency rules, courts should feel no more hesi-
tant about consulting pre-promulgation materials.
216. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1053-61 (explaining that the rules may supersede ex-
isting statutes, and that Congress sometimes legislates to amend the rules). In the last
decade, the Court's rulemaking process has come to resemble the more open APA notice-
and-comment procedures. See id. at 1061-64, 1073; Robert G. Bone, The Process of Mak-
ing Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87
GEO. L.. 887, 902-07, 954 (1999) ("[Court] rulemaking today more closely resembles a
legislative process with broad public participation and interest group compromise than the
process of principled deliberation it was originally conceived to be."). This may enhance
the utility of explanatory materials that accompany rules in the future. See Moore, supra
note 9, at 1093-94 ("In the rules context, the legislative history consists of the comments of
the Advisory Committee and the other bodies involved in the promulgation process" even
though the Court as the ultimate decisionmaker does not have to issue an explanation.
"[I]n the future there is likely to be more extensive rulemaking history from the bodies
that have drafted a new Rule or amendment."); cf. Bone, supra, at 953 & n.302 (arguing
that future advisory committee notes should provide clearer explanations of the rules).
217. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123-27
(1989) (focusing on the plain meaning of the rule and, in contrast to the dissenting opin-
ion, declining to cite the advisory committee notes in the course of evaluating policy ar-
guments); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1986) (focusing on the plain language
of a rule, though finding confirmation in the advisory committee notes).
218. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295,2309-14 (1999) (relying heavily
on the advisory committee notes accompanying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-25 (1997) (repeatedly citing those
notes); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,179-84 (1997) (repeatedly citing the notes
accompanying the Federal Rules of Evidence). Along similar lines, courts look to the offi-
cial commentary that accompanies uniform laws adopted by state legislatures as a form of
legislative history. See Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597,598 n.3, 602-06,631.
219. But cf. Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 720,728-29 (1988) (arguing that the Court should pay little attention to the advisory
committee notes and feel less constrained about flexibly interpreting its rules).
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(2) Regulatory Analyses
Agencies increasingly must prepare regulatory analyses of vari-
ous types, which may be summarized in the published preamble and
made available in full upon request. Congress has added a series of
analytical demands that agencies consider the possible consequences
of their actions on such things as the environment, small businesses,
and paperwork burdens; in addition, executive orders over the years
have called on agencies to pay special attention to possible impacts on
inflation, business, and federalism.220 Many of these materials subse-
quently must be made available to the public.221
A number of these analytical requirements direct agencies to
consider alternatives and to explain why they decided against adopt-
ing these alternatives in favor of the final rule. Obviously, if an
agency specifically considers and rejects such alternatives to a regula-
tion that it promulgates, it should not subsequently interpret the
regulation as if it encompassed one or more of those alternatives all
along. Nonetheless, so far it appears that no court has credited such
materials in the course of interpreting an ambiguous agency regula-
tion. 2
These analytical requirements do not simply seek to discipline
agency decisionmaking. They also create documentation that other
institutions rely on in assessing a new legislative rule. All three
branches of government look to these regulatory analyses when re-
viewing administrative action. In particular, "report-and-wait"
mechanisms sometimes provide Congress with the opportunity to
consider overriding certain types of regulations. -3 Since 1996, Con-
220. See Noah, supra note 157, at 404-05 (summarizing these various analytical re-
quirements); see also Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 111-18
(1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting a challenge to a final regulatory flexibility analysis).
221. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 604(b) (West Supp. 1999) (regulatory flexibility analyses); 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994) (environmental impact statements); 44 U.S.C.A. § 3507(e)
(West Supp. 1999) (paperwork burden analyses); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(E)(I)
& (b)(4)(D), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735,51,741-43 (1993) (cost-benefit analyses).
222. Cf. Pfizer Inc. v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 1502, 1509-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the
"[1]anguage in the Inflation Impact Statement cannot control the plain meaning of the
[maximum allowable cost] regulation," and adding in dicta that it would not give the
statement much attention even in the case of an ambiguity, especially where it was incon-
sistent with the NPRM, and that the statement did not support the company's preferred
interpretation in any event); Seneca Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 712 F.2d 1384, 1393,
1400 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he regulatory analysis is a lengthy unreliable infe-
rior source.... This selected isolated paragraph of an unreliable inferior source cannot
be treated as controlling .... ").
223. See, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,531-34 (1982) (describing
the congressional failure to disapprove the regulations implementing Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972). The federal rules of procedure provide another example of
this approach. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994) (requiring that the Supreme Court transmit
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gress has demanded that agencies transmit all rules to it accompanied
by any available cost-benefit and other regulatory analyses.
2 4
Whether or not one defends this procedure as a realistic method for
promoting accountability, Congress thereby has assumed that the ac-
companying explanatory materials have some reliability. For an
agency to disregard such contemporaneous interpretations at a sub-
sequent date would amount to a "bait-and-switch" strategy.
225
Here one might draw an analogy to the interpretation of interna-
tional treaties based on their negotiating history (travaux prdpara-
toires) and the explanations provided by State Department officials to
secure Senate ratification. Several scholars have criticized claims
made by members of the executive branch that the President need not
abide by such explanations when later choosing to reinterpret an in-
ternational treaty.226 Otherwise, these critics argue, Presidents would
manage to amend treaties without satisfying the ratification proce-
dures specified in the Constitution. For similar reasons, the regula-
any new rules to Congress seven months before their effective date). Before the Court
invalidated legislative vetoes, Congress sometimes made agency rules subject to unicam-
eral disapproval. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 36-37, 44-45 (1983) (declining to read anything into congressional failures to
veto NHTSA's passive restraint standard).
224. See Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 801(a)(1)(B)
(West Supp. 1999); Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency
Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1997).
225. Cf. National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
227, 231,234,236 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasizing repeatedly that, where an agency had an-
nounced an interpretation of a rule accepted by the Supreme Court in the course of re-
solving a challenge to its validity, the agency could not subsequently alter its reading but
would have to amend the rule by notice and comment). One could make the same point
about congressional testimony by agency officials, which may derail legislative proposals
to override or supplement a regulation. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA,
153 F.3d 155, 168-71 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that an agency's interpretation of a statutory
provision that conflicts with an earlier interpretation is entitled to less deference than a
consistently held agency view), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (Apr. 26, 1999) (No. 98-1152).
Courts have not, however, generally given such testimony much credence as a basis for
interpreting a regulation. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d
579, 587 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative In-
action, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,127-28, 130-31 (1988) (cataloging the Supreme Court's incon-
sistent treatment of apparent legislative acquiescence in agency interpretations of a stat-
ute).
226. See Michael J. Glennon, Interpreting "Interpretation". The President, the Senate,
and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 913, 916-
19 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation:
What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 331, 333-42 (1990); David A. Koplow,
Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1353, 1425-27, 1434-35 (1989); Gary Michael Buechler, Note, Constitutional
Limits on the President's Power to Interpret Treaties: The Sofaer Doctrine, the Biden Con-
dition, and the Doctrine of Binding Authoritative Representations, 78 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2015-
18 (1990).
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tory analyses and other explanatory materials that agencies now must
transmit to Congress should set comparable limitations on subsequent
agency reinterpretations of a rule.
In contrast, the Supreme Court recently rejected a suggested
parallel between the advisory committee notes to the rules of proce-
dure and the official commentary issued by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to further clarify its guidelines, precisely because the lat-
ter may not appear until after Congress has acquiesced in the sen-
tencing guidelines presented for its consideration.227 Like the federal
rules of procedure, sentencing guidelines do not take effect until after
surviving a report-and-wait process. Congress has six months within
which to review new guidelines if it wishes to block them with a reso-
lution of disapproval, but the Commission subsequently may revise its
commentary without again going before Congress. Nonetheless, the
Court held that the commentary "binds" judges by virtue of the rule
of deference to post-promulgation interpretations of regulations by
agencies.2 s Putting aside the questionable retention and extension of
that rule of deference, the Court's analysis suggests that, at least since
Congress began reviewing new agency rules in 1996, preambles and
regulatory analyses may have a better pedigree by virtue of that re-
port-and-wait system and, therefore, deserve closer attention from
the courts than they have received in the past, more akin to the re-
spect given to the advisory committee notes that accompany the fed-
eral rules of procedure. 229
227. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 43-44 (1993) ("We do not think it helpful
to treat commentary as a contemporaneous statement of intent by the drafters or issuers
of the guideline, having a status similar to that of, for example, legislative committee re-
ports or the advisory committee notes to the various federal rules of procedure and evi-
dence."). By comparison, advisory committee notes accompany federal rules of procedure
when sent to Congress and are not subsequently modified, so the Supreme Court might
resist adopting novel interpretations after the fact. Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,298
(1969) ("We have no power to rewrite the Rules by judicial interpretations.... [An ex-
pansive interpretation must have been] within the purpose of the draftsmen or the con-
gressional understanding.").
228. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-46; id. at 46 ("Amended commentary is binding on the
federal courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress. .. ."); see also id. (noting the
irony that the Commission had described its commentary as "legislative history" that
could provide only some evidence of its intended meaning); cf. Paralyzed Veterans of Am.
v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,585 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasizing, in deferring to DOJ's
post-promulgation view, that "Congress, by specifically requiring the publication of a
technical manual that would further refine or interpret in detail the [ADA] regulation's
substantive obligations, contemplated a continuing administration of the regulation").
229. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text; cf. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680,707-08,712-13,716-19 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that, where
Congress has cross-referenced one agency's existing rules in a statutory amendment, a
second agency given the responsibility to implement the statute should not receive defer-
ence for its interpretation of those regulations but instead that the first agency's intent, to
[Vol. 51
(3) Other Published Documents
Courts also may look to the notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM), and any advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM), for interpretive guidance. Although the APA calls for
only sketchy information in the NPRM,2 ° courts began remanding
rules for inadequate notice when the proposals lacked enough speci-
ficity.231 Just as preambles accompanying final rules became tomes in
response to substantive review of the "concise general statement of
their basis and purpose," agencies expanded their NPRMs to include
both the proposed text of a rule and a preliminary preamble that dif-
fers from a final preamble primarily by anticipating rather than re-
sponding to public comments. 2 The APA does not require the issu-
ance of ANPRMs, but a few statutes call for them as the initial step in
particular rulemaking proceedings,233 and some agencies have decided
to use them routinely for certain classes of regulations23 4
Although cited only infrequently by the courts,235 NPRMs can of-
the extent it can be discovered, should control the question in the event of any ambiguity);
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986) (crediting congressional ac-
quiescence to an agency's interpretation of its implementing regulation).
230. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1994) (requiring that the notice include "either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved").
231. See United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 535-36
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,251-52 (2d
Cir. 1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-400 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
see also Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473,484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (invalidating a rule for
inadequate notice because the final version was not a "logical outgrowth" of the proposal);
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741,750-52 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same).
232. Again, to take an extreme recent example, the FDA's tobacco product marketing
NPRM and appended jurisdictional statement exceeded 470 pages. See 60 Fed. Reg.
41,313 (1995); see also Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the
FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1996) (discussing this
mammoth and largely misguided rulemaking exercise).
233. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a) (1994) (CPSC).
234. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(6)-(7) (1999) (delineating the FDA's over-the-
counter drug review process); 29 C.F.R. § 1990.141 (1999) (specifying OSHA's standard-
setting process for potential carcinogens).
235. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 48-49 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en banc) (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting from NPRM, and arguing that such "con-
temporaneous statements of the purpose of the regulations, and not the NRC's later rep-
resentations to this court... , must guide the interpretation of the emergency planning
regulations"). The Supreme Court once rejected statements made by an agency in an
NPRM as providing any guidance about agency policy because this proposal had never
been finalized. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 836 (1985); see also Anderson Bros.
Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 229 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for relying on a pending proposal to amend a regulation as a source of legitimate guidance
about the meaning of that regulation); cf. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla
Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501, 504 (1988) (disregarding certain expressions of con-
gressional intent not linked to any statutory text); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
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fer valuable guidance about agency intent. For example, the fact that
the originally proposed text contained a particular provision that does
not appear in the final rule, even if not explained in the final pream-
ble, may suggest a conscious decision against addressing that subject
in the regulation (though it might also imply that the agency thought
that the rule already covered it and that separate specification simply
created surplusage),236 In particular, if the preamble to a final rule in-
corporates by reference the agency's earlier explanation of an aspect
of the rule,237 a court should regard that part of the NPRM as no less
authoritative than the final preamble. In addition, ANPRMs may ex-
plain more clearly than some of the subsequent Federal Register no-
tices what problems the agency sought to address and some of the
regulatory alternatives that it had originally considered.
Other documents linked to a rulemaking proceeding may not ap-
pear in the Federal Register but could provide further evidence about
the agency's thinking. For instance, letters denying a petition for re-
consideration may provide guidance238 Informal guidelines may have
served as a precursor for a subsequently promulgated legislative
rule.239 Transcripts of advisory committee meetings or public hear-
ings may help illuminate issues that influenced the agency's decision-
Local No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] cardinal principle of the
judicial function of statutory interpretation is that courts have no authority to enforce
principles gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point.").
236. See Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 427 n.13, 428 n.14 (1988) ("[W]ithout ex-
planation, the notice provision [that the agency had proposed revising] was shifted back to
its original, and current, form.... [T]his history provides strong support for the conclusion
that the current provision does not extend beyond applicants."); Jewett v. Commissioner,
455 U.S. 305, 312-15 (1982) (discussing a change in a critical term between the proposed
and final rule, which evidently was not explained in the 1958 preamble but in a memoran-
dum sent from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Treasury more
than one month earlier); Electronic Eng'g Co. v. FCC, 140 F.3d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1998) ("Indeed, the Commission initially proposed that a coordinator return an applica-
tion if it disagrees with a request for a specific frequency, but ultimately decided against
this proposal in its final rules."). Even more clearly, if a regulation amends an earlier
regulation, the differences in text between the two versions can provide evidence of the
agency's intent. See Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448,455 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1994).
237. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 31,192, 31,199 (1997); 54 Fed. Reg. 48,892, 48,893 (1989); 52
Fed. Reg. 38,852,38,852 (1987).
238. Cf. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 n.12, 340-41
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (referencing the agency's rationales for denying such a petition in the
course of rejecting a substantive challenge).
239. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (treating an agency's staff instruction
as a contemporaneous interpretation of a statutory provision subsequently reflected in a
regulation that deserved substantial deference); see also Sekula, 39 F.3d at 456 ("We find it
particularly significant that the agency's interpretation of the regulation is contained in a
question-and-answer booklet they disseminated to financial institutions for distribution to
the public" both before and after amending the regulation in question.).
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making process.24 Regulated parties may have made commitments
memorialized in correspondence with the agency in exchange for con-
cessions in the text of a final rule.241 The APA requires that agencies
make all such documents "available for public inspection and copy-
ing."242
In some instances, requirements for more formal rulemaking
procedures will produce a hearing record as well as findings of fact
and conclusions of law.243 Because of the enormous time and effort
involved in such trial-like proceedings,244 however, agencies have
240. See Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food
Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. REV. 329,416 & n.383 (1998) (referring to the FDA
advisory committee meeting that reviewed olestra); see also Steven P. Croley & William F.
Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
451, 504, 513 (1997) (summarizing requirements that agency advisory committees retain
and make available to the public the minutes and any transcripts of their meetings). But
cf. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en
bane) (refusing to inquire into "the collective mental processes" of a multi-member com-
mission by reviewing available transcripts of a closed meeting); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
Federal Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 1189, 1193 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982) (con-
sidering the transcript of a public advisory committee meeting, but finding it unilluminat-
ing and also not adequate to resolve concerns about the lack of fair notice to regulated
entities before the agency pursued an enforcement action because the transcript had not
been published in the Federal Register).
241. See 61 Fed. Reg. 3118, 3168-69 (1996) (cross-referencing in the preamble to the
final regulation approving the food additive olestra commitments made by the manufac-
turer in letters received by the agency after the close of the public comment period).
242. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 20.103(a) (1999) (providing for
public access to any official FDA correspondence unless otherwise exempt from disclo-
sure); cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Internal Relations of Government: Cautionary Tales from
Inside the Black Box, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 155, 160 ("[T]he federal
government's web sites are many, yet many seem constructed largely as tourist attractions,
rather than serious centers for information dispersal; few if any agencies yet make rule-
making or its documents electronically accessible." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
On the question of what properly constitutes an administrative record for purposes of ju-
dicial review of an agency rule as it has evolved, see James V. DeLong, Informal Rule-
making and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 269-72, 350-53 (1979);
William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38, 60-
82 (1975); id. at 79 (proposing the compilation of a closed rulemaking file). Administra-
tive records have become unwieldy. See Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions
on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 142 (1982) ("The physi-
cal impossibility of a single judge (and law clerk) reading every page of a 10,000 page
rulemaking record-five years in the making-puts a high priority on organization of that
record." (footnote omitted)).
243. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 557(c) (1994); see also Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for
the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1276, 1286 (1972) ("The final order includes
detailed findings of fact and conclusions upon which the order is based. Such findings are
typically lengthy and replete with numerous citations to the transcript and documentary
exhibits.").
244. See Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Admini-
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largely abandoned formal rulemaking whenever possible. Even so,
Congress continues to supplement or "hybridize" the APA's basic no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking procedures for particular agencies in
ways that may provide more complete administrative records and fur-
ther sources for possible clues about original intent. 45
(4) Miscellaneous Materials
Regulated parties may attempt to depose agency officials who
were responsible for drafting the regulation or else seek discovery of
documents reflecting internal deliberations. Unlike the shield given
members of Congress by the speech or debate clause,246 agency offi-
cials may have to testify about their decisionmaking where necessary
to provide a record for judicial review, though courts require this only
occasionally in resolving substantive challenges. 247 The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),248 enacted in 1966, became a discovery
mechanism for private parties seeking access to internal documents
stration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1142 (1972) ("[Tjhe FDA has conducted two major [formal
rulemaking] proceedings that have been the subject of wide criticism. Both proceedings
have taken (or will take) more than ten years from the formulation of the original pro-
posal to the actual effective date of the regulation.").
245. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B) (1994) (requiring that certain EPA rulemaking
proceedings maintain a docket containing, in addition to the NPRM and comments re-
ceived, drafts of proposed rules submitted for interagency review, and all documents ac-
companying them and responding to them, as well as the promulgated rule and the various
accompanying agency documents which explain and justify it).
246. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing that, "for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther House, [Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place"); see also
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-22 (1972) (holding that the Speech & Debate
clause also applies to legislative aids); Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Gov-
ernment Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 889-927
(1985) (explaining the basis for the Speech & Debate clause).
247. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per curiam); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); Animal Defense Council v. Ho-
del, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913,
916, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator:
Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure
Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 762-68 (1975); see also Southwest
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir.
1996) (summarizing various legitimate bases for considering information not in the ad-
ministrative record); McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 650 F.2d
1216, 1229 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that, where the preamble explained the
final regulations, the district court should not have referred to the depositions already
taken of agency officials who had been involved in the rulemaking); Russell L. Weaver,
Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 109, 136-44 (1991) (discussing
same).
248. See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994)).
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that may shed light on an agency's intent,2 49 though it exempts pre-
decisional deliberative process materials from disclosure 0 Discov-
ery requests also may be used in an attempt to identify possible pro-
cedural irregularities such as improper ex parte communications or
impermissible prejudgment by an agency decisionmaker.251 The ad-
vent of negotiated rulemaking, which gives interested parties the op-
portunity to hammer out a compromise over language that will be-
come the basis for the agency's NPRM, raises a related set of
questions about attempting to determine what happened behind the
scenes that may have affected the particular form of the regulation ul-
timately promulgated by the agency3. 2
Although sometimes included in a rulemaking docket,2 3 agencies
do not routinely publish staff memoranda and similar internal docu-
ments, and these materials provide a questionable basis for inter-
preting a regulation in any event,2 4 though in one case the Supreme
Court relied on an internal memorandum sent from the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of the Treasury more
249. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 1470 (commenting that FOIA "quickly became a dis-
covery vehicle for the underlying data of rulemaking"); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the
Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 152-91 (1984);
Michael M. Lowe, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in 1993-1994, 43 DUKE L.J.
1282, 1283 n.7 (1994) ("[The most popular use of FOIA has been by businessmen and
lawyers as an aid in industry and in court.").
250. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994); Wolfe v. HHS, 839 F.2d 768, 774-76 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (en banc); Hunt v. United States Marine Corps., 935 F. Supp. 46, 51-52 (D.D.C.
1996); Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo.
L. REV. 279, 309 (1989); cf. Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the Gen-
eral Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. LJ. 845, 913-16 (1990) (questioning whether FOIA
properly incorporated this privilege).
251. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Crate., 984 F.2d 1534,
1538-39, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1993).
252. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994); USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708,
714-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claim that an agency had acted in bad faith when
promulgating a rule that deviated from its announced bargaining position, and declining
request for additional discovery of notes kept by participants in the regulatory negotia-
tion); see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Nego-
tiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DuKE LJ. 1351, 1356-65, 1374-87
(1997) (discussing these questions at length); Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An
Update, 46 DUKE LJ. 1445, 1457-72 (1997) (same); cf. Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's
First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 290-93 (1991) (quoting
from transcripts of the Board's preliminary discussions about proposing a rule).
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B) (1994).
254. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 33-34 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en banc) (rejecting a public interest group's novel suggestion that a staff report
cross-referenced in a footnote to the final rule could restrict the agency's power to inter-
pret that rule differently); cf. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC,
725 F.2d 1442, 1450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("At some point... staff-prepared synopses may
so distort the record that an agency decisionmaking body can no longer rely on them in
meeting its obligations under the law.").
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than one month before the issuance of a final rule which explained
the rationale for a critical revision to the proposed text2 5 In addition,
agency officials may publish articles or otherwise convey their under-
standing of the meaning of a newly promulgated regulation, and these
contemporaneous though post-promulgation recollections may pro-
vide some guidance about the original agency intent. For example, in
Seminole Rock, which first announced the rule of deference, the Su-
preme Court looked to a bulletin issued by the agency and designed
to explain the new regulation to the industry.256 Ultimately, however,
such unofficial sources provide a haphazard, potentially unreliable,
and nowadays largely unnecessary basis for identifying the agency's
intent in rulemaking.
Conclusion
This Article has compared the recent ferment about statutory in-
terpretation and the use of legislative histories with the apparent in-
difference about how to interpret agency rules. The contrast usefully
draws attention to some puzzles in the way courts approach the latter
task. These questions merit more attention than they have received
heretofore given the relatively greater prevalence and practical im-
port of legislative rules as compared with statutory commands. Blind
judicial deference to post-promulgation explanations of an agency's
original intent grants executive officials unnecessary and perhaps un-
fair license for creative reinterpretations of a rule. Whatever one
thinks of dynamic judicial approaches to construing statutes, courts
would do well to use intentionalism-whose limitations in the reading
of statutes seem less bothersome in the administrative arena-as a
counterweight to agency tendencies toward dynamism-an interpre-
tive strategy whose supposed advantages seem even less apt in this
context-in construing their own regulations.
In combination with the expansion of preambles and the formal-
ization of administrative records prompted by more searching judicial
scrutiny of informal rulemaking, collateral statutes have expanded the
amount and availability of pre-promulgation materials. The rule of
strong deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations,
in lieu of an inquiry into original intent, emerged at a time when
courts had little else to go on--even though, during that same era,
255. See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 312-15 & n.15 (1982) (noting that this
particular document was published in Tax Notes more than 20 years later).
256. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945). But cf. Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
that the subsequent congressional testimony by an agency official about the meaning of a
regulation "is no more probative then would be a congressman's post-enactment testi-
mony as to what Congress intended when it passed legislation").
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they showed little compunction about consulting pre-enactment ma-
terials for evidence of legislative intent when construing statutes. The
dearth of readily available information about rulemaking intent in
1945 no longer exists today. During the last thirty years, the quantity
and accessibility of pre-promulgation materials have exploded. More
importantly, these materials pose less of a risk of manipulation or cir-
cumvention of procedures for legislating than do legislative histories.
On the contrary, the alternative of excessive deference to post-
promulgation interpretations invites agencies to sidestep APA proce-
dures. Courts should embrace such valuable interpretive materials
rather than rushing to defer to the interpretation that an incumbent
administration finds most convenient at the moment.
* * *
